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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4- 103(2)(j) which states that the Utah Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction
over issues relating to orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record which are
transferred to the Court of Appeals by the Utah Supreme Court. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A4-103(2)(j) (2008). On January 6, 2009 this matter was transferred to the Court of Appeals
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The Defendants/Appellants have presented two primary issues in this matter.
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss
based on the argument that a private right of action to enforce the insurance code does not
exist. (ROA 2091-2114; 2193).
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of statutes, rules and ordinances
is a question of law reviewed for correctness. See, Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d
1201, 1203 (Utah 1999); Taylor ex rel C.T. v. Johnson, 977 P.2d 479, 480 (Utah 1999).
Additionally, a question of legislative intent associated with statutory interpretation is a
matter of law, not of fact. See State v. Mitchell, 824 P.2d 469,471-72 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Issue No. 2: Whether the trial court erred in certifying the Documentary Service Fee
(Doc Fee), Vehicle Theft Policies (VTP), and Guaranteed Auto Protection (GAP) classes.
(ROA 2091-2114; 2193).
Standard of Review: A district court's certification of a class is reviewed under an
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abuse of discretion standard. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 184 (Utah 1986).
DETERMINATIVE LAW
The following statutes and rules are of central importance to this appeal and are set
out verbatim in Addendum A attached hereto: Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101; Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-15-105; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-1-102; Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-2-201; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203; Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5;
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306; and Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a class action suit purportedly filed on behalf of individuals purchasing new

and used automobiles from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi ("MRM") and Midway Auto Plaza
("Midway"). At the time these individuals purchased their vehicles from the Appellants, the
putative class members either (1) purchased various products referred to as Vehicle Theft
Policies ("VTP"), (2) obtained Guaranteed Automobile Protection ("GAP") insurance, and/or
(3) paid dealer documentary service fees ("Doc Fees"). The class action seeks a ruling from
the Court that MRM and Midway did not comply with various aspects of Utah law in relation
to their charging for and/or sale of the VTP products, GAP insurance and Doc Fees.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This action was originally filed on December 30, 2004. (ROA 1). Later, on June 1,

2005, the Appellees filed a "Class Action Amended Complaint"which was served on the
Appellants in July, 2005. (ROA 183). On November 14, 2005 the Appellees filed a "Class
2
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Action Second Amended Complaint." (ROA 183). On May 17, 2007 the Appellees filed
their Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle Theft Policies, Motion for Certification
of Class Re: GAP Insurance, and Motion for Certification of Class Re: Dealer Documentary
Service Fees. (ROA 405, 511, 563). On June 29, 2007 Appellants filed a Memoranda in
Opposition to each of the Appellees5 certification motions.

(ROA 630, 773, 924).

Additionally, the Utah Automobile Dealers Association filed an Amicus Curiae in Opposition
to Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class on June 29, 2007. (ROA 1066). On
September 12, 2007 the Appellees filed reply memoranda in support of their Motions for
Certification. (ROA 1170, 1235, 1346, 1464), Soon thereafter, on September 28, 2007 the
Appellantsfiledtheir Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft
and Gap Insurance Policies. (ROA 1607). Appellees' filed their response to Appellants'
Motion to Dismiss on November 1, 2007 and Appellants' filed a Reply on November 19,
2007. (ROA 1633, 1781).
The Court held a hearing on the Motion to Dismiss and two of the Motions for Class
Certification, those for VTP and GAP insurance on April 24, 2008. (ROA 1833). On May
28, 2008 the Court held a hearing on the Motion for the Certification of the Dealer
Documentary Service Fees class. (ROA 2090).
On July 30, 2008 the Court issued a 'Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Plaintiffs' Class Claims Challenging Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies and Ruling
on Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: Vehicle Theft Policies and Ruling on

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Plaintiffs' Motion for Certification of Class Re: GAP Insurance and Ruling on Plaintiffs'
Motion for Certification of Class Re: Dealer Documentary Service Fees and Ruling on
Defendants' Motion to Strike." (ROA 2091-2114). The July 30, 2008 ruling denied the
Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and granted the Appellees' class certification Motions. Id.
After receiving the July 30, 2008 ruling, on August 29, 2008 the Appellants filed a
Motion to Reconsider or Alternatively, for a Stay Pending Interlocutory Appeal. (ROA
2115). On November 7, 2008, after the Appellants' Motion to Reconsider had been fully
briefed, the Court entered a Ruling again denying the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and
granting the Appellees' class certifications Motions. (ROA 2191).
The Appellants thereafter filed a Notice of Filing of Petition for Interlocutory Appeal
in the Utah Supreme Court on December 3,2008. (ROA 2198). The Utah Supreme Court
granted permission to appeal on January 16, 2009. (ROA 2198).
C.

DISPOSITION IN TRIAL COURT
The July 30, 2008 ruling denied the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and granted the

Appellees' Motions for Certification. (ROA 2092). With regard to the Appellants' Motion
to Dismiss, the Court stated that it found the case of Surety Underwriters v. E.C. Trucking,
10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000) dispositive, since it purportedly upheld a private right of action
under subsection (1) of §31 A-15-105 and this would, by extension, also allow a private right
of action for subsection (2) of the same statute. (ROA 2099-2100). Upon reconsideration
of the Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, however, the Court acknowledged that its analysis of
Surety Underwriters v. E.C, Trucking, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000) was misapplied since its
4
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holding merely stated that § 31A-15-105 (1) was a valid affirmative defense. (ROA 2193).
However, despite noting that "it is possible that the Court's interpretation of the statute is
incorrect" the Court nevertheless upheld its interpretation of the statute to allow a private
right of action. (ROA 2193).
With regard to the Plaintiffs5 Motions for Certification, the Court's initial ruling found
that Rule 23(a) and 23(b)(3) were satisfied since (a) numerosity had been stipulated to; (b)
there was commonality for Doc Fee classes because there was a common question regarding
whether the actions of the Appellants violated the law and thus rendered the Doc Fees
invalid; the VTP classes involved a simple question as to whether the Appellants' sold an
insurance product at a time when the Appellants did not have a license to sell insurance
products, and the GAP classes involved a simple question as to whether the Appellees
purchased an invalid insurance policy from one of the Appellant dealerships since they did
not have direct privity of contract with a licensed insurer; (c) the typicality requirement
merged with the commonality requirement; (d) the class representatives requirement is not
stringent and therefore the proffered representatives are adequate absent a showing that their
interests are "antagonistic" to the other members of the class; and (e) the predominance and
superiority requirements of 23(b)(3) were satisfied because the commonality and typicality
requirements had been met and the individual claims, if brought alone, were too small to
merit individual litigation. (ROA 2102-2113). However, the Court required that there
should be three distinct VTP classes: (1) those purchasing an "Etch" product from Midway
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Auto Plaza, (2) those purchasing an "Etch" product from Mike Riddle Mitsubishi, and (3)
those purchasing a "VTP" product from Midway Auto Plaza. (ROA 2102-2113).
In its Ruling on Appellants' Motion to Reconsider or Alternatively, for a Stay Pending
Interlocutory Appeal and Ruling on Appellants' Objection to Plaintiffs' Proposed Order, the
Court stated that the circumstances surrounding the various sales were sufficiently similar
that they "constitute a common course of conduct related to sales of specific types of
products, and the commonality and typicality prongs are satisfied." (ROA 2195). Therefore
it did not modify its initial rulings on the class certifications. Id.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Plaintiffs/Appellees are purchasers ofvehicles from Appellant Midway, located

in Layton, Utah, and Appellant MRM, located in Woods Cross, Utah. (ROA 36-157; ROA
183-259).
2.

Each Appellee purchased a car under unique facts and circumstances: some

signed multiple sets of contracts (Dalton Jaques) while some signed one set (Gregory
Heiner); some traded in a vehicle (Nicholas Rodarte) while others did not (Jodi Poll
Holbrook); and some relied on Appellants to obtain financing (Melissa Thomas) while others
obtained their own loans (Gregory Heiner). (ROA 190-199, 637, 668-687, 712).
3.

Appellant Midway, which began doing business before 2000, sells used cars

and Appellant MRM, which began doing business in February 2004, sells primarily new
cars. (ROA 638).
4.

Midway and MRM are separate entities and have separate business practices,
6
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bookkeeping, management, employee manuals, and training materials. (ROA 638, 690).
Procedural History of the Case
5.

Appellees filed a Complaint on December 30, 2004, alleging various causes

of action, including fraud and violations of several Utah statutes. (ROA 1-35)
6.

Appellees filed a Class Action Amended Complaint on June 1, 2005. The

Complaint alleged various causes of action associated with Appellants' practices of (a)
charging Dealer Documentary Service Fees ("Doc Fees"), (b) selling Vehicle Theft Policies
("VTP"), and selling Guaranteed Automobile Protection policies ("GAP"). (ROA 36-157)
7.

On March 23, 2006 the parties entered a Stipulated Case Management Order

and Initial Attorneys Planning Meeting Report ("Order"), severing the claims of the
individual Appellees from the class claims and stipulating that the individual claims would
proceed separately from the class claims. The Order bifurcated discovery into Phase 1,
which relates to class certification, and Phase 2, which relates to the merits of any claims
certified for class treatment. Phase 1 of discovery has been completed. (ROA 260,638).
8.

In accordance with the Order, Appelleesfileda Class Action Second Amended

Complaint on November 11,2005, solely challenging Appellants' charging of Doc Fees and
the selling ofVTP and GAP. (ROA 183-259).
The Sales Process at Midway and MRM
9.

The process of selling a vehicle varies according to the particular customer and

dealership involved. (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131;
Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702).
7
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10.

In general, at both Midway and MRM, if a customer wishes to purchase a

vehicle after talking with the salesperson and, in some cases, taking a test drive, the customer
sits down with the salesperson and begins negotiating the terms of the sale. (Depo. Reid Teo,
ROA 704-723).
11.

Sometimes, but not always, a trade-in vehicle is involved in the transaction, and

the general manager of either MRM or Midway evaluates the value of the trade-in vehicle.
(Depo. Mike Dockery, ROA 725-729).
12.

Transactions involving trade-ins involve much more paperwork than

transactions without a trade-in. (ROA 638).
13.

Sometimes a customer pays the full sticker price of the car, sometimes the price

varies from the sticker price because of features and options sought by the customer, and
sometimes the general manager discounts the vehicle through a series of negotiations.
(Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723).
14.

Frequently, but not always, the salesperson gives the customer a rough estimate

of the monthly payment range, and the price of the car plus tax, license, and fees. (Depo.
Reid Teo, ROA 704-723).
15.

These estimates are sometimes taken to the general manager's office and, after

the general manager reviews the proposed terms, the salesman returns with a separate
document, called a "pencil" or "write- up." (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723).
16.

Although in some cases the "pencil" is signed by the customer, customers can
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renegotiate the deal after signing the "pencil" (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723).
17.

Negotiation worksheets, including "pencils," do not contain contractual

language and terms, the "pencil" is not considered to be a binding contract, and there is no
legal obligation to buy the car if only the "pencil" is signed. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA
689-702; Amicus Curiae Brief of Utah Automobile Dealers Association, ROA1066-1114).
18.

Typically, the customer next visits the Finance and Insurance Office, which is

where the legal documents are prepared and it is in the Finance and Insurance Office that a
purchaser signs the legally binding contract, which is the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale.
(Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702).
19.

Before the customer signs the contract, the finance manager explains the

financial portions of the contract line by line and also explains the Truth in Lending Act
disclosure. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739).
20.

In some cases, Midway or MRM arranges financing for the customer. In such

cases, the customer also signs a Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement around
the same time that he or she signs the Motor Vehicle Contract of Sale. (Depo. Spencer
Castle, ROA 689-702).
21.

The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement form used by

Appellants is similar to or the same as that accepted and used by the Utah Banker's and
Automobile Dealers'Associations. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114).
22.

If financing is required, the finance manager will generally submit a generic
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credit application signed by the customer to several different financial institutions and, in
most cases, the bank or financial institution sends word of approval or disapproval while the
customer is still in the finance manager's office. (Amicus Brief, ROA1066-1114).
23.

The amount of time it takes to obtain financing and complete the paperwork

for a customer depends on considerations such as the number of lenders contacted and the
credit history of the purchaser. (ROA 641; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131).
24.

The Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement identifies the dealer

as the seller, the customer as the buyer, and the lender agreeing to finance the loan as the
assignee. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702).
25.

Title clerks and office workers at MRM and Midway prepare and then take the

paperwork for the purchased car to the appropriate state agency, register the purchased car,
and obtain the car's license plates. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702).
Dealer Documentary Service Fees (Doc Fees)
26.

The Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division ("Division") is primarily responsible

for overseeing the charging of Doc Fees. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115 - 1120).
27.

The Division has not established any set Doc Fee amount that can be charged,

and the Utah Legislature has not regulated Doc Fees. (Id.).
28.

Although the Division requires all car dealerships to prominently display signs

at the dealership explaining Doc Fees, posting these signs in the dealership's Finance and
Insurance Offices complies with the requirements. (Id.).
29.

Officers from the Division randomly inspect dealerships to make sure they
10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

have Doc Fees signs prominently displayed, preferably in the Finance and Insurance Offices.
(Amicus Brief, ROA1075).
30.

Neither Midway nor MRM has ever been cited for violating state regulations

governing Doc Fees. (Aff. Nancy Wilde, ROA 741 -745; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 747-751).
31.

At both Midway and MRM, Doc Fees signs are openly displayed in the Finance

and Insurance Offices. (Depo. Reid Teo, ROA 704-723; Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689702; Depo. Mike Dockery, ROA 725-729; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739; Depo. Daniel
LePelley, ROA 753-756).
32.

At MRM, during the relevant time period, a Doc Fees sign was also displayed

on the wall between the lobby and the service center. (Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731 -739).
33.

The Doc Fees sign that was displayed at both Midway and MRM states:

THE DEALER DOCUMENTARY SERVICE FEE OF $399.99 AS SET
FORTH IN YOUR CONTRACT REPRESENTS COSTS AND PROFIT TO
THE DEALER FOR PREPARING AND PROCESSING DOCUMENTS
AND OTHER SERVICES RELATED TO THE SALE OR LEASE OF YOUR
VEHICLE. THESE FEES ARE NOT SET OR STATE MANDATED BY
STATE STATUTE OR RULE.
(Aff. Nancy Wilde, Ex. 2, ROA 741-745; Aff. Camille Wilde, Ex. 2, ROA 747-751).
34.

Many customers at Midway asked salespeople about how much the Doc Fee

was and the salesperson would refer the customer to the finance manager. (Depo. Reid Teo,
ROA 704-723).
35.

All, or nearly all, dealerships charge Doc Fees to cover, among other things,

the costs of securing financing for the purchaser, filing paperwork, licensing, and preparing
11
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documents. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1117; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131).
36.

Doc Fees also cover the costs of locating, obtaining, and paying for form sale

contracts. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 689-702; Aff. Gary Howe, ROA 1128-1131)
37.

The amount of the Doc Fees varied during the time periods relevant to this

action. At Midway, the Doc Fee was $249.00 from prior to 2000 to January 31, 2002;
$289.95 from January 1, 2003 to September 19,2003; $299.95 from September 20, 2003 to
August 30, 2004; and $399.95 after August 31,2004. At MRM, the Doc Fee was $299.95
from February 2004 to August 31,2004, and $399.95 after September 1,2004. (ROA 643).
38.

Generally, few customers object to paying the Doc Fees. (Depo. Jason Earl,

ROA 731-739).
39.

Some of the named Appellees have admitted that they had no objection to

paying Doc Fees. (Depo. Melissa Nielson, ROA 759; Depo. Nicholas Rodarte, ROA 765).
VTP Products
40.

VTP products like those sold by Midway and MRM are common and accepted

in the industry and are sold by most car dealers in Utah. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1119).
41.

At Midway, two general types of VTP products were sold during the time

period relevant to this action, although the actual policies and products within these two
categories differed through the years. (Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 976-988).
42.

From 2001 to 2003, Midway offered a starter interrupt system. Beginning in

February 2004, Midway began almost exclusively offering acid etching. (ROA 935).
43.

The only VTP product MRM ever offered is acid etching. (ROA 935).
12
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44.

The starter interrupt system required physical installation of hardware that

essentially disrupted the vehicle's electrical system and prevented ignition of the vehicle
without a "second key." (ROA 935).
45.

During some years, starter interrupt systems were installed as a matter of course

on newer model and higher quality used cars, without prior request from customers. Most
of these cars were sold without the customer agreeing to pay for the system. (ROA 935).
46.

In these cases, Midway did not activate the "second key" device in the vehicle.

(ROA 935).
47.

The starter interrupt products sold by Midway also typically provided a

monetary benefit, such as $1500, if the car was stolen within a certain number of years from
the starter interrupts purchase date and was not recovered within thirty days. (ROA 936).
48.

Midway estimates that it sold approximately 300 starter interrupt devices to

Midway customers between 2001 and 2004. (ROA 936).
49.

The second general category of VTP products is acid etching, where a

registration number, phone number for a national database, and other information are etched
with acid onto a vehicle's windows. (Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 1013-1019).
50.

Customers are also provided with window stencils to notify the public that

etching has been applied and to deter thieves. (Depo. Michelle Davis, ROA 1021-1025).
51.

Although Appellants apply etching to all of their vehicles, only customers who

pay for the system have their vehicles registered in the national database. (ROA 936).
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52.

If a registered etched car is stolen and recovered, law enforcement officials can

identify the vehicle's owner by calling the database number and reciting the registration
number. (Depo. Michelle Davis, ROA 1021-1025).
53.

In some policies, purchasers of the etching system also receive a credit, such

as $2500 or $5000, toward the purchase of another vehicle if their vehicle is stolen and not
recovered within thirty days. (Depo. David Griffiths, ROA 1027-1031).
54.

Typically, even if a vehicle is stolen and recovered within the thirty days, the

customer still receives a credit, such as $1000, toward purchase of another vehicle. (Depo.
David Griffiths, ROA 1027-1031).
55.

Customers purchasing an etching system can choose how many years of

coverage to pay for, for instance two, three, or five years. (ROA 937).
56.

Midway sold 234 etch products between 2004 and 2006. (ROA 937).

57.

MRM sold 1155 etch products between 2004 and 2006. (ROA 937).

58.

Customers are provided with written brochures and other information about the

VTP products sold by both Midway and MRM before deciding whether to purchase the
products and customers are not required to purchase VTP devices in order to buy the car.
(Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 1013-1019; Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 1033-1035).
59.

The VTP products sold by Appellants were obtained through agents for the

various product administrators. The agents used by Appellants are Michelle Davis of
Competitive Dealer Services and David Griffiths of Profit Concepts, Inc. (ROA 937).
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60.

Davis sells her products primarily in Utah and Griffiths sells his products

throughout Utah and in eighteen other states. (Aff. Michelle Davis, ROA 1038-1040; Aff.
David Griffiths, ROA 1042-1047).
61.

The VTP products sold by Appellants are well known and accepted in the

industry. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114; Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115 - 1120).
62.

The Utah State Department of Insurance considers VTP products like those

sold by Midway and MRM to be insurance. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115-1120).
63.

Both Appellants and their finance managers have "limited lines" insurance

licenses that allow them to sell the described VTP products. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA
1115 - 1120; Aff Nancy Wilde, ROA 1049-1053; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 1055-1059).
64.

A "limited lines" license issued by the Utah State Insurance Department is all

that is needed to sell VTP products. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1115-1120).
65.

All of the VTP programs offered by Midway and MRM are underwritten by

insurance companies that are licensed to do business and registered in the state of Utah. (Aff.
Michelle Davis, ROA 1038-1040; Aff. David Griffiths, ROA 1042-1047).
66.

Appellees' claims related to VTP are based on their alleged violation of Utah

law, specifically the Utah Insurance Code. (Class Action Second Amended Complaint, ROA
243-248)7
GAP Insurance
67.

GAP insurance is a common and accepted insurance product that is offered by

many automobile dealerships in Utah. (Amicus Brief, ROA 1066-1114).
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68.

In the event of a total loss of the vehicle, a GAP insurance plan, including those

plans that have the term "waiver" in their title, covers any difference between what the car
owner's primary insurance company pays and the remaining balance owed to the lender.
(Depo. Spencer Castle, ROA 830-840; Depo. Jason Earl, ROA 731-739; Depo. Daniel
LePelley, ROA 871-878; Depo. David Griffiths, ROA 900-905).
69.

GAP insurance is regulated by the Utah State Insurance Commission

("Commission"), which requires those selling GAP Insurance to have a "limited lines" license
issued by the Commission. (Amicus Brief, ROA1066-1114; Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA
1115-1120).
70.

Administrators and underwriters of GAP insurance must be registered with the

Commission, and copies of their products' policies must be on file with the Commission
before the GAP product can be sold in Utah. (Aff. Craig Bickmore, ROA 1119).
71.

The GAP policies sold by Midway and MRM during all times relevant to this

action were properly filed with the Commission. (Aff. Michelle Davis, ROA 880-882; Aff.
David Griffiths, ROA 884-886).
72.

Both Midway and MRM have "limited lines" licenses allowing them to sell

GAP insurance. (Aff. Nancy Wilde, ROA 888-892; Aff. Camille Wilde, ROA 894-898).
73.

Midway and MRM obtained the GAP products they sold from licensed

independent third-party dealers and brokers, such as David Griffiths of Profit Concepts, Inc.
and Michelle Davis of Competitive Dealer Services. (ROA 786).
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74.

The administrators and underwriters of all of the GAP insurance presently or

previously sold by MRM and Midway are registered with the Commission. (Aff. Michelle
Davis, ROA 880-882; Aff. David Griffiths, ROA 884-886).
75.

Although each policy is different, typically the administrator of a GAP plan is

not the underwriter of the coverage, but contracts with one or more insurance companies to
underwrite the GAP products it administers. (ROA 786).
76.

While some GAP plans were written between Midway or MRM and the

customer, the administrative responsibilities for these plans are provided by another party and
indemnity for claims paid is underwritten by insurance companies contracted by the GAP
product administrator. (ROA 786).
77.

All GAP policies are underwritten by one or more insurance companies.

(Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 871-878).
78.

At MRM, 383 GAP policies were sold during 2004, 461 policies were sold

during 2005, and 297 policies were sold during 2006; while at Midway, 27 GAP polices were
sold during 2000,205 during 2001,220 during 2002,237 during 2003,259 during 2004,318
during 2005, and 277 during 2006. (ROA 787).
79.

At MRM and Midway, GAP policies were sold during the relevant time period

through several different administrators including Innovative Aftermarket Systems, John F.
Sutherland and Associates Insurance Services, Inc., Beacon Industries Worldwide, Inc., FLS
Services, Inc., American Heritage Insurance Services, CU Direct Corporation (also doing
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business as or in association with Credit Union Direct Lending ("CUDL"), CUNA, and
Cumis Insurance Society), and Safe-Guard Protection International, Inc. (ROA 787).
80.

At both MRM and Midway, the GAP plans from the different administrators

varied from year to year. Depending largely on the year and the administrator, the GAP plans
sold by both MRM and Midway contained different terms, including the maximum term of
the underlying financing agreement for which the GAP coverage would apply (e.g., 60
months, 72 months, or 84 months) and the scope of the coverage, including whether the GAP
policy covered up to 120 percent of the value of the vehicle or up to 150 percent of the value
of the vehicle. (ROA 788).
81.

At both MRM and Midway, customers could negotiate the price of the GAP

product, and a customer was not required to purchase GAP in order to purchase the car.
(ROA 788; Depo. Daniel LePelley, ROA 871-878).
82.

The amount that Appellants could charge for GAP insurance was determined

by the financial institution with whom the purchaser's financing had been arranged since the
price of the GAP coverage is typically financed by the customer along with the price of the
vehicle, and lenders wished to protect their security interest in the vehicle sold. (ROA 788).
83.

Appellees' claims related to GAP are based on their alleged violation of Utah

law, specifically the Utah Insurance Code. (Class Action Second Amended Complaint, ROA
248-253).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
I.

The District Court erred in denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss and finding that

a private right of action exists for an individual to enforce the Utah Insurance Code.
I-A.

The Utah Insurance Code is a regulatory scheme that unambiguously vests power to

determine Insurance Code violations with the Insurance Commissioner.

The entire

regulatory scheme contained within the Utah Insurance Code must be read together in order
to properly apply the provisions contained therein. There are no exceptions to the
Commissioner's authority to determine violations. § 31 A-15-105(2) only allows the recovery
of insurance premiums in instances where the Insurance Code has been violated. This is
supported by the legislative history. Accordingly, the trial court does not have jurisdiction
to adjudicate the VTP and GAP claims being presented by the Appellees.
I-B.

There is no private right of action, express or implied, that supports the Appellees'

claims. The Insurance Code does not expressly provide for a private right of action. Utah
courts have considered other provisions of the Insurance Code and determined that a private
right of action does not exist for those sections. In fact, courts across the country have
specifically held that no private right of action exists whereby an individual may enforce the
provisions of an Insurance Code as they relate to the sale of insurance by an
unauthorized/unlicensed insurer. Where no express private right of action exists, Utah courts
are properly reluctant to imply a private right of action.
I-C.

An "implied" right of action is inappropriate in light of the regulatory nature of the
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Insurance Code. The Utah Insurance Code is intended to be enforced through the Insurance
Department and by its provisions is regulatory in nature. The Insurance Department has
specialized skill, knowledge and experience in applying the provisions of the Insurance Code
to those individuals and entities that fall within its authority. Allowing a private citizen to
circumvent the regulatory scheme by submitting provisions in piecemeal fashion to the courts
frustrates the purpose of the Insurance Code and the existence of the Insurance Department.
Appellees should not be allowed to side-step the Insurance Department and regulate the
insurance industry by way of their lawsuit.
II.

The District Court abused its discretion in certifying the classes because the individual

classes do not comply with the requirements of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
II-A. The Doc Fees classes should not have been certified because the Rule 23 requirements
have not been met. The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met
because there is no common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for any of the Doc Fee claims
being made. Different Doc Fees were charged over different periods and the work that went
into a given sale varied from customer to customer. The factual and legal issues vary
significantly among the representative class members such that any relief granted for one
class member would likely not apply to most if not all of the other class members.
Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met where the
class representatives are more interested in their individual claims than the class action
claims, and in many cases are not even aware of, or interested in, the class claims.
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In addition, Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the class members all have
divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the divergent interests of
the class members, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims
being raised will be extraordinarily difficult in light of the varying circumstances of each of
the class members.
II-B. The VTP class should also not have been certified because of Rule 23 deficiencies.
The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met because there is no
common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for the VTP claims made. Different VTP products
were sold to various customers, but none of the class members has alleged any actual failure
or problem with the VTP product sold. Indeed, the few VTP complaints of the named
Appellee class members are different and varied and have little to do with VTP. Thus, any
relief granted for one class member would not apply to most if not all of the other class
members. Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met
where the class members are more interested in their individual claims than the class action
claims, and in many cases are not even aware or interested in the class claims.
In addition, the Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the few VTP class members
have divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the class members'
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divergent interests, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims
being raised will be very difficult in light of the class members5 divergent circumstances.
II-C. Finally, the GAP insurance class should not have been certified because the Rule 23
requirements have not been met. The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality
are not met because there is no common plan or scheme of wrongdoing for any of the GAP
insurance claims being made. GAP insurance is a standard product sold at nearly all car
dealerships. Although GAP insurance products were sold to various customers, none of the
class members have alleged any actual problems with the GAP insurance sold. Rather, those
of the Appellees that even have complaints related to the GAP insurance base their
complaints on the manner in which the GAP insurance was disclosed to them during their
automobile purchase rather than on the actual GAP insurance itself. Also, the factual and
legal issues vary significantly among the representative class members such that any relief
granted for one class member would likely not apply to most if not all of the other class
members. Furthermore, the Rule 23(a) adequacy of representation requirement is not met
where the class members are more interested in their individual claims than the class action
claims, and in many cases are not even aware or interested in the class claims.
In addition, the Appellees are also unable to satisfy the Rule 23(b) requirements of
predominance and superiority. Predominance is not met since the GAP class members have
divergent interests and experiences. Superiority is not met due to the class members'
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divergent interests, the fact that the class members already have separate lawsuits wherein
their actual grievances are being addressed, and the fact that adjudicating the class claims
being raised will be very difficult in light of the class members' divergent circumstances.
Because neither the Rule 23(a) nor 23(b) requirements have been met for the Doc
Fees, VTP and GAP classes, the trial court abused its discretion in certifying these classes.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT A PRIVATE RIGHT
OF ACTION EXISTS UNDER THE UTAH INSURANCE CODE.
The district court should have dismissed Appellees' claims relating to GAP and VTP.

Appellees have alleged that by selling Vehicle Theft and GAP Insurance Policies, Appellants
have violated various provisions of the Utah Insurance Code. Indeed, all of Appellees'
claims related to Appellants' sale of VTP and GAP products assert violations of the Utah
Insurance Code. The Utah Insurance Code is regulatory in nature and does not expressly
provide for a private right of action. Utah courts are very reluctant to infer a private right of
action where, as here, the Legislature could have granted such and failed to do so. Therefore,
since Appellees cannot directly maintain these causes of action for Appellants' alleged
violation of the Insurance Code, the District Court erred in failing to dismiss these claims.
A-

The District Court's Ruling Finding a Private Right of Action Contradicts
§ 31A-2-201 and Abrogates the Authority of the Insurance Department.

The power of enforcement for any alleged Insurance Code violation exclusively rests
with the Insurance Commissioner. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(l) unambiguously states
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that "[t]he commissioner shall administer and enforce this title." The Insurance Code does
not authorize the courts to determine Insurance Code violations, but instead requires that
"ftjhe commissioner shall inquire into violations of this title...to determine: (a) whether or
not any person has violated any provision of this title; or (b) to secure information useful
in the lawful administration of this title. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-201 (6) (emphasis added).
There are no exceptions to the Commissioner's authority to determine violations. In
fact, the Commissioner has an ongoing duty to examine and review licensed insurers and
their businesses to ensure compliance with the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203
(2008). Furthermore, the Commissioner is required to comply with the provisions of the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act codified under Title 63G in enforcing the regulatory
scheme created by the code. See Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-203.5 (2008). The Insurance
Code must be read and interpreted as a whole and harmonized with the section of the code
being cited by the Appellees as justifying their class action insurance claims.
In this case, the auto dealer Appellants engaged in the standard industry business
practices of selling GAP insurance and VTP products to automobile purchasers who
requested these products. Appellees allege, without basis, that Appellants were not
authorized to sell these regulated products. In fact, Appellants possessed "limited lines
certificates" commonly held for this purpose. Appellees specifically claimed a private right
of action under Utah Code § 31A-15-105(2), which states:
"An insurance policy entered into in violation of this chapter is voidable by
the policyholder who entered into the transaction without knowing it was
24
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illegal. The policyholder may avoid the contract by notice to the insurer if no
insured has enforced the contract by an action under [31 A-15-105(1)], and may
recover any consideration paid under the contract." (Emphasis added).
In its July 30, 2008 ruling on Appellants' Motion to Dismiss, the district court found
that a "private right of action" exists pursuant to § 31 A-15-105, and held that it therefore has
jurisdiction to determine whether Appellants were "unauthorized insurers" under the
Insurance Code. The Court relied on § 31A-15-101(2), which states that one of the purposes
of Chapter 15 is to "subject the unauthorized insurers and other powers doing an insurance
business in Utah to the jurisdiction of the Utah commissioner and the courts." The court also
heavily relied onSurety Underwriters v. E.C. Trucking, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah2000), statingthat
in Surety Underwriters: "an individual was able to seek relief from the courts under
subsection (1) of the same statute that is the basis of the plaintiffs' claims in this case." (July
30, 2008 Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).
The Court originally held that "[i]f an individual has a right to seek relief from the
courts under subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105, it is reasonable that an
individual would also be able to seek relief from the courts under subsection (2) of that
statute." Id. Later, however, the Court admitted that it had "misapplied" the analysis of
Surety Underwriters stating that:
"[cjontrary to the Court's ruling, the trial court in that case was not ruling on
whether a party had a right of action under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-105(1).
Instead, the trial court only ruled that because the insurance company was not
licensed in Utah, the defendant had a valid affirmative defense under Utah
Code Ann. § 31A-15-105(1)."
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See November 7,2008 Ruling on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. (ROA 2193). Surety
Underwriters is also inapplicable to the instant case on separate grounds.1
In recognition that Surety Underwriters is inapplicable, the district court's reasoning
that a private right of action exists under § 31 A-15-105 rested solely upon the court's isolated
interpretation of the language of § 31 A-15-101(2) which states that "It is the purpose of this
chapter to...subject unauthorized insurers...to the jurisdiction of the Utah commissioner and
courts." The district court acknowledged its ruling was thinly supported, and lamented that
"there is no case law that directly addresses the section cited above [31A-15-105(1)]," and
that "[it] is possible that the Court's interpretation of the statute is incorrect." Id.
The district court did not consider or comment on the regulatory nature of the
Insurance Code, nor did it consider any of the other Code provisions incorporating courts into
the regulatory scheme that would call into question its interpretation of § 31A-15-101(2).
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 31A-2-306 (2008) (Providing for judicial review of
commissioner determinations). Appellants respectfully submit that the district court erred.
Both the Utah Supreme Court and Utah Court of Appeals have stated that, when
interpreting a statute, a Utah court:
"looks first to the statute's plain language to determine the Legislature's intent

^Surety Underwriters is also inapplicable to the present case because in that case it
was "undisputed that at the time the parties entered into the insurance contract, [insurer] was
not licensed to engage in an insurance business in Utah, nor did it have a certificate of
authority." Surety Underwriters, 2000 UT 71, ^[40. Hence, there was no dispute that the
insurer was an unauthorized insurer in violation of Utah's Insurance Act.
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and purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and
related chapters. We follow the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent
and purport of the whole act shall control, and that all the parts be interpreted
as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest object."
Hansen v. Eyre, 74 P.3d 1182, 1185 (Utah Ct. App. 2003) (citing Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d
592 (Utah 2003)). Here, the overall purpose of the "whole" Insurance Code is to regulate
the insurance industry. As such, § 31A-2-201(6) giving the Commissioner exclusive
authority to determine violations of the Act, § 31A-15-101(2) subjecting unauthorized
insurers to jurisdiction of the Commissioner and the courts, and § 31A-15-105(2) giving a
policyholder the right to recover the cost of a policy sold by an unauthorized insurer, must
all be interpreted as subsidiary to and harmonious with the Code's manifest object of
regulating the insurance industry in Utah.
Whether or not Appellees have a remedy under § 31A-15-105 would only possibly
become relevant after a finding of a requisite violation. Under § 31A-2-201, only the
Commissioner is authorized to determine whether or not a person has violated the Insurance
Code. Section 31A-2-201 is consistent with, not contrary to, §31A-15-101(2). Section31A15-101(2) does not state that its purpose is to subject parties alleged to be unauthorized
insurers to the jurisdiction of the courts to determine whether or not such party is an
unauthorized insurer. At most, it merely gives the courts jurisdiction over a party that is
already determined to be an unauthorized insurer by the Commissioner pursuant to § 31A-2201. Hence, Appellees' alleged right to recovery under § 31A-15-105 only arises, if at all,
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after Appellants are found to be unauthorized insurers by the Commissioner.
The legislative history of Chapter 15 further suggests an intent to limit standing to
enforce the provisions of this chapter to the Commissioner. The Utah Supreme Court has
stated that when a statute is ambiguous, "we use extrinsic interpretive tools such as policy
and legislative intent to guide our analysis.55 R&R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas.
Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 199 P.3d 917, 923 (Utah 2008). In 1985 the Utah Legislature, as part of
a complete re-codification of the Insurance Code, enacted Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers
and Surplus Lines, to replace Chapter 38, the Unauthorized Insurers Act. See Utah Code
Ann. § 31A-15-101 et seq. The legislative record surrounding the re-codification project
includes a statement by the Utah Attorney General's Office to the Insurance Code Task
Force, in which the culpability of persons who procure illegal contracts is discussed. The
Memorandum specifically characterizes the "broader reach" of the proposed Code section
as "an important tool of the Commissioner.'5 (Follow-up Statement to Insurance Code Task
Force; Re: Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers and Surplus Lines, Sep. 3, 19852, attached
hereto as Addendum B). The statement expresses an intent to "increase judicial efficiency
and economy by allowing the Commissioner to stand in the shoes of many insureds," thus
allowing the court to "hear only one action instead of many." Id.
Comparing the stated purpose of the previous code section to that of the current

inventory of Bill Drafting and Comment Files from Insurance Code Task Force
1985-86, Utah State Archives Collection, Series 25137, Reel 1, Box 1, Folder 7.
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enactment is also helpful in interpreting the intent of Chapter 15. As currently stated, the
purpose of Chapter 15 includes the phrase "subject[ing] unauthorized insurers and other
persons doing an insurance business to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and
the courts." Utah Code Ann. § 31A-15-101(2). However, the previous iteration stated as its
purpose "to subject certain insurers to ^jurisdiction ofthe insurance commissioner and the
courts of this state in suits by or on behalf of the state" Utah Code Ann. § 31-38-2 (1974)
(Repealed 1985, emphasis added). The new language, which includes "other persons doing
an insurance business," is consistent with the proposal by the Attorney General to provide
a "broader sweep" and include within the scope of the Chapter persons other than sellers who
may also be culpable in selling illegal contracts. See Follow-up Statement to Insurance Code
Task Force, attached as Addendum B. However, nothing in the history suggests that the
language of the previous act, which expressly subjects insurers only to suits "by or on behalf
of the state" was intended to be radically modified or altered to provide a new private right
of action for individuals to determine violations of the Insurance Code.
Other jurisdictions have specifically held that, under similar statutory schemes, the
Commissioner alone has the authority to determine violations of the Insurance Code. See,
e.g., Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316, 325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) ("As
to this second point, plaintiffs do not contend that a private right of action exists for pertinent
Insurance Code violations, nor can they. Insurance Code section 1758.65 grants the
Commissioner the power to enforce the relevant sections of the Insurance Code. A statute
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creates a private right of action only if the statutory language or legislative history
affirmatively indicates such an intent.") (Emphasis added, internal quotations omitted).
Even taking the Appellees5 arguments at face value, when read together with the other
provisions of the Insurance Code, § 31A-15-105(2) could only possibly provide, at best, a
limited right to recover the premiums paid for a policy issued by an unauthorized insurer.
However, this right to reimbursement only ever arises after the Commissioner, not the
courts, exercises the Commissioner's express statutory authority and makes a determination
that the policy was issued in violation of the Insurance Code.
Furthermore, if §31A-15-105(2) is read in harmony with § 31A-15-101(2), even this
limited right was meant to be enforced through the Insurance Department. The Insurance
Department would, on behalf of an insured, thereafter also pursue the reimbursement claims
against violators of the Code in court, thereby preserving the regulatory nature of the
statutory scheme. This method of enforcement is consistent with the original language of the
Chapter which was "to subject certain insurers to the jurisdiction of the insurance
commissioner and the courts of this state in suits by or on behalf of the state." Utah Code
Ann. § 31-38-2 (1974) (Repealed 1985, emphasis added).
This is not a case where administrative remedies are insufficient. The Code fully
provides Appellees with an administrative means to address their claims. Upon finding a
violation to which § 31A-15-105 provides a remedy, the Commissioner "shall issue
prohibitory, mandatory, or other orders necessary to secure compliance with this title." Utah
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Code Ann. § 31A-2-201(4). Appellees have failed to pursue, let alone exhaust, these
administrative remedies. Only after the exhaustion of this administrative process do the
courts have jurisdiction over "unauthorized insurers" pursuant to § 31A-15-101(2).
Otherwise, the described regulatory scheme is for naught, and a party can circumvent the
Insurance Department's authority to regulate, by asserting an individual's regulatory claims
in court.
Because Appellees are alleging that common industry practices actually violate the
Insurance Code, this is the quintessential case where the Insurance Department, not the
courts, should decide the issue. The Insurance Department possesses specialized skills and
knowledge about whether Appellants are an unauthorized insurer under the Code, and is
therefore better situated than the courts to make such a determination. The Commissioner
has not had an opportunity to determine whether Appellants violated the Insurance Code with
regard to their marketing and/or selling of GAP and ATP products. While § 31 A-2-201(6)
sufficiently places the question of whether or not Appellants were "unauthorized insurers"
within the sole jurisdiction of the Insurance Department, it is even more critical that this
matter be decided by the Department, because this determination is certain to regulate
common industry practices for all automobile dealers in Utah.
The Court's error in creating a private right of action has allowed Appellees' claims
to proceed in court, where Appellees' claims should be administratively redressed through
the Insurance Department. The Court's ruling directly contradicts the Commissioner's
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express authority to determine violations of the Insurance Code pursuant to § 31 A-2-201 (6),
and allows Appellees to circumvent the Commissioner's exclusive authority and thereby
judicially regulate insurance industry contrary to statute and contrary to legislative intent.
B.

There is No Private Right of Action, Express or Implied, that Supports
Appellees' Claims.

A private right of action, express or implied, has not been found by Utah courts under
any section of the Utah Insurance Code. Because the Utah Insurance Code does not
expressly provide for any private right of action, only an "implied" right, if any, could exist.
However, "Utah courts have rarely, if ever, found a Utah statute to grant an "implied" private
right of action." Buckner v. Kennard, 99 P.3d 842, 853 (Utah 2004); see also Miller v.
Weaver, 66 P.3d 592, 588-89 (Utah 2003) (citing numerous Utah cases in various statutory
contexts where private rights of action were not implied and reaffirming reluctance of courts
to imply a private right of action based on state law); Broadbent v. Bd. ofEduc, 910 P.2d
1274, 1279 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("the courts of this state are not generally in the habit of
implying a private right of action based upon state law, absent some specific direction from
the Legislature.").
Utah courts have not specifically addressed whether a private right of action exists
under § 31 A-2-201. However, the Utah Supreme Court has considered this question under
other regulatory insurance provisions and has uniformly found that a private right of action
does not exist in these contexts.
For instance, in Machan v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., 116 P,3d 342 (Utah 2005), the
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appellee asserted that the court should imply a private right of action under§ 31 A-26-301 of
the Insurance Code, which governs timely payment of insurance claims. Id. The court
disagreed and reasoned that this section of the Insurance Code regulated the professional
duties of insurance adjusters and did not create a private right of action. Id. at 347-48. The
court noted that a related section of the Code governing unfair claims settlement practices
explicitly stated that it "did not create any private cause of action." Id. The court then made
the general observation that "in the absence of statutory language expressly indicating a
legislative intent to grant a private right of action, Utah courts are reluctant to recognize an
implied right" and thus disallowed "a private cause of action by an insured against an
insurer," under that section of the Insurance Code. Id.
Other Utah decisions have reached the same conclusion. See Saleh v. Farmers Ins.
Exch, 133 P.3d 428, 436 (Utah 2006) (citing Machan and stating that "this court recently
held that Utah Code § 31 A-26-301 [of the Insurance Code] does not allow a private right
cause of action by an insured against an insurer"); Cannon v. Travelers Indent. Co., 994 P.2d
824, 828-29 (Utah Ct. App. 2000) (holding that unfair insurance claims practices in Utah
Code § 31A-26-303 did not create private cause of action). It would be unprecedented to
allow Appellees' private claims for violation of the Insurance Code to proceed. Appellees
have failed to cite any express statutory authority permitting them to bring such claims. The
relevant Supreme Court holdings are clear in denying private rights of action in connection
with other sections of the Insurance Code.
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Other jurisdictions, when considering this same issue under similar statutory schemes,
have, consistent with Utah, also held there is no private right of action for the violation of
selling insurance without a license. See, e.g., American Auto. Ins. Co. v. McDonald, 812
So.2d 309, 312 (Ala. 2001) (holding that there is no private right of action for party alleging
violation of selling insurance without a license); Peterson v. Cellco Partnership, 164
Cal.App.4th 1583,1595,80 Cal.Rptr.3d 316,325 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 2008) (holding that there
is no private right of action for unlicensed sale of cellular phone insurance policies); Van
Zanen v. Qwest Wireless, L.L.C, 550 F.Supp.2d 1261 (D. Colo. 2007), affd Van Zanen v.
Qwest Wireless, L.L. C., 522 F.3d 1127 (1 Oth Cir. 2008) (holding that there is no private right
of action for unlicensed sale of insurance for wireless telephone equipment).
C-

It is Error to Imply a Private Right of Action When a Statutory Scheme
Is Regulatory in Nature.

Utah Courts are reluctant to imply private rights of action in the context of a
regulatory statutory scheme. See e.g. Cannon v. Travelers Indem. Co., 994 P.2d 824 (Utah
Ct. App. 2000) (stating that Rule 590-89-3 of the Administrative Code is "is regulatory in
nature and is not intended to create a private right of action."); Miller v. Weaver, 66 P.3d 592,
598-599 (Utah 2003) ("In the absence of language expressly granting aprivate right of action
in the statute itself, the courts of this state are reluctant to imply a private right of action
based on state law"). This policy avoids inconsistent and unauthorized judicial regulation
when conduct is already aggressively regulated under statutory authority by an agency that
possesses specialized skills and knowledge. See Miller, 66 P.3d at 599 ("This reluctance [to
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imply a private right of action] is particularly strong when the Legislature has already
designated a method of resolution through an administrative agency specifically empowered
to handle issues." Emphasis added).
It is undeniable that the Utah Insurance Code is regulatory in nature. Utah Code Ann.
§ 31A-1-102 states that the "purposes of the Insurance Code are to . . . (5) encourage
cooperation between the Insurance Department and other Utah regulatory bodies, as well
as other federal and state governmental entities; (6)preserve and improve State regulation
of insurance; ... (8) encourage self regulation of the insurance industry." Id. (Emphasis
added). Furthermore, similar to other regulatory entities, the Commissioner has an ongoing
duty to examine and review licensed insurers and their businesses to ensure compliance with
the Code and is required to comply with the provisions of the Utah Administrative
Procedures Act in doing so. See Utah Code Ann. §31A-2-203 (2008); Utah Code Ann.
§31A-2-203.5(2008).
Because Utah's Insurance Department has both the statutory authority and specialized
expertise to regulate the insurance industry in Utah, it is improper to imply a private right of
action to enforce Utah's Insurance Code where it is squarely regulatory in nature. Moreover,
because the practices that Appellees allege to be violations of Utah's Insurance Code are
common industry practices, it is highly improper to allow Appellees to side-step the
Commissioner unilaterally in an attempt to regulate and reform the insurance industry by way
of this lawsuit.
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II.

THE DISTRICT COURT'S CERTIFICATION OF THE DOCUMENTARY
SERVICE FEES, VTP, AND GAP CLASSES WAS IMPROPER.
Under Utah law, "the trial court may certify a class only if, after rigorous analysis, it

determines that the proposed class satisfies the prerequisites of [Rule] 23(a)." JB. exrel Hart
v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280,1287-88 (10th Cir. 1999)3. In seeking certification, Appellees have
the burden of establishing that certification is proper. See Ditty v. Check Rite, Ltd., 182
F.RD. 639, 641 (D.Utah 1998).
A*

The legal standard for certification under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Utah Rule 23(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides four requirements for
certification:
"One or more members of a class may sue ... as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3)
the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or
defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class."
Utah R. Civ. P. 23(a). Appellees, as class plaintiffs, must demonstrate that all four
requirements -numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation- are
satisfied. See Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307, 1310 (10th Cir. 1988).

3

Since the language of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is nearly identical
to the language of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah courts looks to
federal case law for guidance. See Oakwood VilL, L.L.C. v. Albertsons, Inc., 104 P.3d 1226,
1231 (Utah 2004) ("Where, as here, there is almost no case law interpreting the Utah rule and
the Utah and federal rules are identical, we freely resort to federal law as a useful guide.55).
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First, with regard to the numerosity requirement, although generally left to the court's
discretion, "there must be presented some evidence of established, ascertainable numbers
constituting the class in order to satisfy even the most liberal interpretation of the numerosity
requirement." Rex v. Owens9 585 F.2d 432, 436 (10th Cir.1978).
Next, the commonality requirement "is met if [P]laintiffsf grievances share a common
question of law or of fact." JB. ex rel Hart, 186 F.3d at 1288. If a defendant has engaged
in a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct that "affects a group of persons and gives
rise to a cause of action, one or more of the elements of that cause of action will be common
to all ofthe persons affected'' Rugumbwa v. Betten Motor Sales, 200 F.R.D. 358,361 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (Emphasis added).
Third, typicality requires the claims of the class representatives to be typical of those
of the potential class. "Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists between
the injury to the named [Plaintiffs] and the conduct affecting the class, so that the court may
properly attribute a collective nature to the challenged conduct." Zapata v. IBP, Inc., 167
F.R.D. 147,160 (D. Kan. 1996) (quoting 1 Newberg on Class Actions § 3.13, at 3-76). Like
commonality, a plaintiffs claim is "typical" if "it arises from the same event or practice or
course of conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims
are based on the same legal theory." Id. (Emphasis added).
Finally, adequacy or representation requires that the class representatives' interests
be aligned with those of the putative class. "[A] class representative must be part of the class
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and possess the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members." Amchem Prods.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) (Emphasis added). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the
plaintiffs provide "fair and adequate protection for the interests of the class." Ditty v. Check
Rite, Ltd., 182 F.R.D. 639 (D.Utah 1998). "Two factors are important in that determination:
(1) the class attorney's qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct the litigation and (2)
whether the named plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the class." Id. (Emphasis
added).
Rule 23(b) contains additional requirements for class certification. Under Rule
23(b)(3), in addition to meeting the requirements of Rule 23(a), Appellees must also show
that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3); see also Ditty, 182 F.R.D. at 643.
"At its essence, predominance is concerned with whether the putative named
Appellees can, through their individualized cases, offer proof on a class-wide basis." Hyderi
v. Washington Mutual Bank, 235 F.R.D. 390, 398 (N.D. 111. 2006) (Emphasis added) (citing
Hewitt v. Joyce Beverages of Wise, Inc., 721 F.2d 625, 628-629 (7th Cir. 1983)). The
predominance inquiry "tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation." Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 623. Predominance is "far
more demanding" than the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). Id.
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In establishing the superiority requirement, Appellees must demonstrate that a class
action is "superior to, and not just as good as other available methods for handling the
controversy." Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First Interstate Bank, 91 F.R.D. 440,444 (D. Ore. 1983).
Courts use four factors to analyze this requirement of "superiority": (A) the interests of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate
actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; [and] (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action. Utah R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
The evidence presented clearly establishes that Appellees' classes for Doc Fees, VTP
and GAP insurance do not meet the requirements of certification under Rule 23. As such,
the district court abused its discretion in certifying Appellees' various classes.
B.

Certification of the Doc Fees classes was improper.

In their Motion for Certification for the Doc Fees classes, Appellees contended that
Appellants violate "every" Utah law governing Doc Fees. Appellees allege Appellants
violate (1) the Utah Unfair Practices Act ( Utah Code Ann. § 13-5-1, et seq.) by charging
Doc Fees that exceed the actual cost to the Appellants; (2) the Utah Motor Vehicle Act (Utah
Code Ann. § 41-3-210(l)(a)) by failing to include Doc Fees in alleged "advertisements" or
written offers to sell vehicles; (3) the Utah Administrative Code R877-23 V-14, by failing to
segregate Doc Fees from "state mandated fees"; (4) the Motor Vehicle Enforcement Division
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regulations (Utah Administrative Code R877-23V-14), by failing to display or prominently
display signs explaining Doc Fees; and (5) the Uniform Commercial Code covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. None of these causes of action is appropriate for class certification as
they do not meet the requirements of Rule 23.
1.

Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the
Commonality, Typicality and Adequacy of Representation requirements
of Rule 23(a).

The trial court abused its discretion in certifying the Doc Fees classes since three of
the four Rule 23(a) requirements are not met SeeReedv.Bowen, 849F.2d 1307,1310 (10th
Cir. 1988) (must show requirements numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation are each met).
a.

Lack of commonality and typicality.

The trial court committed reversible error in certifying the Doc Fees classes because
Appellees have failed to show a common plan or scheme of wrongdoing and because the
factual and legal questions of the Appellees vary according to each individual transaction
with Appellants.
1.

Absence of a common plan or scheme.

Appellees have alleged that Appellants engaged in a common plan or scheme by
charging Doc Fees in violation of Utah law. Appellees allege that the Doc Fees charged by
Appellants are unlawful under one or more of the following circumstances: (1) where the
Doc Fee charged exceeds the actual cost to the dealership; (2) where the state-required Doc
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Fee sign is not displayed; (3) where the Fee is not included in the advertised price of a
vehicle; and/or (4) where the dealership falsely implied that the Doc Fee was a statemandated fee.
The charging of Doc Fees is an accepted and common practice in the Utah auto
industry. Charging a fee that is expressly permitted by state law is not a plan, scheme, or
even a course of conduct giving rise to a cause of action. Appellees merely allege that the
Doc Fees charged are "unlawful." Appellees essentially admit to no common plan or scheme
because they provide four different sets of circumstances that allegedly could give rise to a
cause of action.
For example, Appellees contend that Appellants schemed to omit Doc Fees from the
"advertised price," which they then construe to refer to the "pencil offer," of the vehicle.
Appellees do not allege that Appellants plotted to produce television or newspaper
• advertisements that failed to disclose the Doc Fees, or that any particular training, manual,
or policy at either MRM or Midway required salespeople to deceive purchasers about Doc
Fees. Appellees allege only that when a "pencil" was used, it did not include the Doc Fees.
Even assuming this allegation is true, "pencils" were not used in every case, and even when
they were used, the price of the car on a "pencil" was often followed by a notation that tax,
license, and fees, were to be added to the price. Moreover, a "pencil" is nothing more than
a negotiating worksheet, and is neither an "advertisement" for the vehicle in question nor a
binding contract. Thus, many different scenarios played out during each individual
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transaction, depending on the purchaser, salesperson, and general manager involved.
By way of further example, Appellees also allege that Appellants' Motor Vehicle
Contract of Sale falsely implies that Doc Fees are state-mandated. This is likewise not a
scheme, or course of conduct. The contract used by Midway and MRM, including the
placement of the Doc Fees line, is similar or identical to forms used by most other
dealerships in the State of Utah. Had Appellees alleged that Appellants took this form and
altered the language or changed the placement of the Doc Fee line, a common "plan of
deception" may have at least been argued. However, no such allegations were or could
reasonably be made. Appellees therefore have not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course
of conduct, and the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality cannot be met.
2.

An individualized inquiry into each purchaser's claim is
required.

The experiences of the Appellees are not similar, or common, to each other, much less
typical of the entire putative class of purchasers. Thus, this issue is unsuitable for class
treatment because of the factual variances inherent in the each Appellee's experience with
Doc Fees. If certification is upheld on appeal, this case will "devolve into a series of
individual trials on issues peculiar to each plaintiff" Zapata, 167F.R.D. at 166. Each of the
four claims of "wrongful conduct" alleged by Appellees would require a series of
individualized questions about each transaction.
Claim No. 1: "Doc Fee exceeds actual cost to dealership."
Appellees have acknowledged that Appellants and most other car dealers in the state
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charge Doc Fees for preparing and processing documents and registering and titling the
vehicle in the name of the buyer. (ROA 569). The Doc Fee also covers the cost of
submitting a credit application signed by the purchaser to one or more financial institutions.
(ROA 1066-1114). To examine the claim that Appellants charged a Doc Fee in excess of
actual costs (i.e. constituted a "profit"), in addition to the initial inquiry as to whether making
a profit is improper, the Court would also have to consider the factual circumstances of each
individual Appellee to answer questions such as: What was the amount of the Doc Fee
charged? When was the Doc Fee charged? How much paperwork was involved in the
individual transaction? How many employees were involved in processing the paperwork and
what were they paid for this work? Did the purchaser trade in a vehicle? Did the purchaser
require that Midway or MRM obtain financing for the purchaser? What was involved in the
registration and titling process of the individual car? How much time was involved in
processing the transaction? What were Midway's and MRM's costs of the above at the time
of the particular transaction? The answers to these questions vary from purchase to purchase
and therefore need to be asked on an individual basis. This is not proper in a class action.
Claim No. 2: "State-required sign is not displayed,"
Appellees assert that the Doc Fees are illegal because the state-mandated signs are not
displayed or not displayed "prominently," in violation of state regulations. To determine
whether this was the case in each of the transactions at issue, the Court would have to ask
each individual Appellee questions such as: Did you enter into, and/or sign, contracts in the
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Finance and Insurance Office of either Midway or MRM? Did you sign contracts in any other
location? Did you see the Doc Fees sign or signs in those offices? Did you see the signs in
any other location at either dealership? The answers given by the class representatives are
unlikely to be the same answers given by putative class members.
Claim No. 3: "The Doc Fee is not included in the advertised price
of the vehicle."
Appellees further complain that the Doc Fee is not included in the "pencil offer" for
sale of the vehicle. Even assuming that the "pencil offer" could be considered an
"advertisement" (which Appellants deny), to determine whether this claim is viable the Court
would have to engage in the following individualized inquiries: Who was the salesperson and
general manager in your transaction? What did the "pencil" negotiations worksheets look
like in your case? Did you sign the worksheet? Did the worksheet note that tax, license, and
fees would be added to the supposedly offered price? What did the "pencil" say in particular
and did it mention Doc fees? What did you understand the "pencil" to be? The answers to
these, and related, inquiries will not be common as to all class members.
Claim No. 4: "Appellants implied doc fee was state-mandated."
This claim would also require individualized questions, such as: What did your
contract look like? Where was the Doc Fee placed in your contract? Did you read the
contract? What did you believe the fee to be? Did the salesperson or others make any
statements stating or implying that the fee was state-mandated? Did you understand the Doc
Fee to be state-mandated?
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The tedious and time-consuming nature of all of these individualized inquiries defeats
any utility that the class action method would provide. The Court need look no further than
the varying circumstances in which the Appellees were charged Doc Fees to ascertain that
this case is inappropriate for certification. See Brooks v. S. Bell Tel & Tel Co., 133 F.R.D.
54, 57 (S.D. Fla. 1990) ("Even among the eleven class representatives there exists little
commonality of fact. Clearly, there is even less commonality of fact among the proposed
5,000 plus class members.").
A cursory look at only two of the class representatives illustrates the lack of
commonality and typicality among even the named Appellees. For example, at one end of
the spectrum is the complicated transaction involving Appellee Dalton Jaques, who
purchased a 2001 Toyota from Midway in August 2004. He signed an initial contract, but
later returned to the dealership and signed a superseding second contract with terms generally
more favorable to him. Mr. Jaques initially represented that he would have $15,000 to put
down on the vehicle, but that down payment did not materialize and was not included in the
second set of contracts. Mr. Jaques did not have a vehicle to trade in. Multiple sets of
paperwork were processed. Midway arranged financing for Mr. Jaques, and multiple lenders
were contacted. Mr. Jaques was charged a Doc Fee of $299.95. The time spent documenting
the Jaques transaction was substantial
At the other end of the spectrum are the more simple dealings with Appellee Gregory
Heiner who, along with his son, purchased a 2003 Acura from Midway in June 2003. He
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visited Midway one time and signed one contract. Mr. Heiner did not trade anything in. He
put $1500 down, arranged his own financing, and delivered a check for the vehicle's
purchase price directly to the dealership. He was charged a Doc Fee of $289.95.
These examples illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and
typicality are not met in this case and that even if the named Appellees were granted some
relief by the Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all members of the class
because of their disparate and individualized circumstances.
b.

Appellees do not meet the Adequacy of Representation
requirement of Rule 23(a),

Appellees are not adequate representatives because their interests are not aligned with
those of the putative class. "[A] class representative must be part of the class and possess the
same interest and suffer the same injury as class members." Amchem Prods, v. Windsor, 521
U.S. 591,625-26 (1997). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that the plaintiffs provide "fair and adequate
protection for the interests of the class." Ditty, 182 F.R.D. at 642. "Two factors are important
in that determination: (1) the class attorney's qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct
the litigation and (2) whether the named plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the
class." Id. (emphasis added). Appellees assert that this requirement is met by their counsel's
experience and ability in conducting class action litigation. While this may be the case,
Appellees fail to address the interests of the named Appellees in relation to the putative class,
the second required factor. An examination of the named Appellees' depositions raises
serious doubts about the adequacy of representation.
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Appellees' interests are antagonistic to those of the putative class members for varying
reasons. Importantly, several of the named Appellees, such as Jodi Poll Holbrook and
Gregory Heiner, affirmatively stated that they have no objection to Appellants' practice of
charging Doc Fees. Such statements are directly antagonistic to putative class members who
claim that Appellants charge Doc Fees in violation of "every" relevant Utah law. CfZapata
v. IBP, Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 168 (D. Kan. 1996) (holding that adequacy of representation
requirement was not satisfied because plaintiff requested to be placed in certain job position,
which created an "inherent conflict of interest" with putative class members who claimed
they were discriminated against when they were assigned to same job position).
Other Appellees, such as Dalton Jaques and Elisha Dela Garza, are only interested in
their own claims. These Appellees stated that their only concern is recovering money they
allegedly lost by doing business with Appellants. This is antagonistic to the interests of
putative class members who need someone who is aware that there are other potential
members of the class, and who would be willing to seek a different, class-wide form of relief
as requested by the Complaint.
Finally, when asked to describe why they were unhappy with Appellants, most of the
Appellees did not complain about Appellants' practice of charging Doc Fees. In fact, one
Appellee, Melissa Thomas, tellingly stated: "I do not know what a dealer documentary fee
is." (Depo. Melissa Thomas, ROA 759). Class members will not be protected by Appellees
who know nothing about Doc Fees and have never complained about them. See, e.g., Asbury
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Automotive Group, Inc. v. Palasack, 237 S.W.3d462,465 (Ark. 2006) (named plaintiff was
adequate representative because he "conducted his own research as to the legitimacy" of a
dealership's practice of charging Doc Fees before deciding to become a class representative).
Dalton Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not understand
what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he is only
concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. (ROA 1455).
Severo Rodriguez is an inadequate class representative because he did not complain
about being charged Doc Fees. He testified that his allegations against Midway relate to
Midway incorrectly filling out documents.
Elisha Dela Garza has no understanding of what being a class representative entails,
has no desire to act as a plaintiff in this case, and is only interested in recovering the money
she believes she lost. (ROA 1458-59). When asked why she was unhappy with Midway, Ms.
Dela Garza explained her allegation that Midway falsified information about her grandfather
on the sales contract and sold her a four-cylinder vehicle instead of a six-cylinder vehicle.
Ms. Dela Garza never mentioned being upset about Doc Fees. Id.
Nicholas Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not possess the
same interest as the other Appellees. Although he stated in his deposition that he was upset
about Doc Fees, he did not say he was upset for any of the reasons asserted by Appellees.
Rather, Mr. Rodarte alleged that the Doc Fee was not disclosed to him and if it had been
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disclosed, he would not have sued over the Doc Fee4. (ROA 764-765)
Jodi Poll Holbrook cannot adequately represent the putative class because she has no
problem with Appellants'practice ofcharging Doc Fees. (ROA 1327-1328). Ms.Holbrook's
complaints against Appellants do not involve charging Doc Fees. (ROA 1327-1328)
Melissa Thomas described various grievances she had with the Appellants, but never
complained about being charged a Doc Fee. In fact, when asked whether she personally had
any objection to a dealership charging a Doc Fee, Ms. Thomas answered, "I do not know
what a dealer documentary fee is." (ROA 759).
Gregory Heiner cannot adequately represent the putative class because he has no
problem with Appellants' practice ofcharging a Doc Fee. (ROA 1331-32).
As outlined above, the deposition testimony of the class representatives demonstrates
their inadequacy to serve as class representatives.
2.

Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3),

The district court erred in certifying the Doc Fees classes because Appellees failed to
show that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R, Civ. P.
23(b)(3).

4

It should be noted that the Doc Fee was clearly listed and identified as such on the
sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed. (ROA 764-765).
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a.

The Predominance Requirement was not met because common
questions of law and fact are not present and therefore do not
predominate.

Appellees cannot meet the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a), because MRM
and Midway did not engage in a common plan or scheme, and individualized inquiries would
have to be made into each Appellee's experience with Doc Fees and how the Doc Fee
charged at the time related to the dealer's costs at the time. Because commonality is not
demonstrated, the requirement of predominance is not met. Class certification was thus
improper.
b.

The Superiority Requirement was not met because the named
Appellees are interested only in their individual claims, and a class
action would be unmanageable.

An examination of the first two of the four "superiority" factors of Rule 23 shows that
superiority has not been met in this case. A court considering the "interests of individual
members in controlling their own cases" must "inform itself of any litigation actually pending
by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 444. In their initial Class Action Amended
Complaint, Appellees asserted twenty-five individual causes of action apart from the class
claims. The Stipulated Case Management Order severed those individual claims from the
class claims. Thus, Appellees already have litigation pending in the trial court on their
numerous individual causes of action. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the
class claims are certified and they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims,
Importantly, as demonstrated by the deposition testimony, Appellees have a strong interest
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in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual actions. By contrast, they lack a
substantial interest in or knowledge about the class claims and have no idea what serving as
a class representative entails. When asked to describe their grievances against Midway or
MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences. When asked why they are suing,
the deposed Appellees generally did not express concerns over the class claims related to Doc
Fees. Appellees1 ignorance of class grievances demonstrates that this putative class action is
nothing more than an attempt to cobble together unrelated consumer claims and experiences
in an effort to reform the automobile industry. The superiority factor is thus not satisfied.
Finally, the management of this class action will prove very difficult, further
precluding Appellees from meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees' first class-those
who purchased cars from Midway-consists of approximately 4262 members; Appellees'
second class-those who purchased cars from MRM-consists of 2250 members. Examining
Appellees' claims would require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of
each Doc Fee charged. In addition, Appellees seek monetary damages in the amount
wrongfully charged for Doc Fees. These damages, even if proven, will not be the same for
every purchaser. The amount of the Doc Fee paid varied according to the time period in
which the vehicle was purchased. More importantly, the amount of the Doc Fee that was
allegedly in excess of the actual cost to the dealership would necessarily vary from person
to person, depending on whether the sale involved a trade-in, involved the dealership
obtaining financing, involved more than one set of paperwork, and so on. In Call v. City of
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W Jordan, 727 P.2d 180, 183-84 (Utah 1986) the court held that a class action was
uncertifiable because "judicial economy would be little served because the amount of the
claim of each class member would still need to be determined on an individual basis,
regardless of class action status," See also Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 445 (noting that in analyzing
manageability factor, f'[t]he court should consider whether damages can be proved by
calculations based on a mathematical formula or whether individualized proof of injury and
damages will be required").

Individualized considerations for more than 6,500 car

purchasers render this class action unmanageable. This Court should reverse the trial court
and, like the court in Call, rule that the Doc Fee classes are uncertifiable,
C.

Certification of VTP classes was improper

Appellees assert essentially three arguments relating to the VTP products: (I) that the
VTP products sold by Midway and MRM are "insurance" under Utah law, (2) that the
dealerships are not authorized to sell these insurance policies, and (3) that VTP policies sold
by Midway and MRM promise monetary benefits from an entity that is not approved as an
insurer in the state of Utah. None of these contentions is appropriate for class certification.
First, certification is inappropriate because the proposed classes do not meet the Rule 23(a)
requirements of commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Second,
certification is inappropriate because common issues do not predominate over individual
issues, and a class action is not the superior method for resolving these disputes.
L

Class Certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the
Commonality, Typicalitv, and Adequacy of Representation requirements
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of Rule 23(a).
The trial court abused its discretion in certifying the VTP classes since Appellees
failed to meet three of the four Rule 23(a) requirements.
a.

Lack of Commonality and Typicality.

Neither commonality nor typicality are met on the facts of this case. Appellees'
Complaint fails to adequately plead a common plan or scheme of wrongdoing with regard
to the sale of VTP products. In addition, these proposed classes are not certifiable because
the factual and legal questions of the Appellees vary according to each individual transaction
with Appellants.
1.

Absence of a Common Plan or Scheme.

Appellees make the conclusory allegation that Appellants engaged in wrongful
conduct by selling promises to indemnify the car buyer for the risk of auto theft without
having to comply with the consumer protections provided in the Utah Insurance Code. (ROA
524). This allegation has no factual basis and is actually contrary to the facts developed
during the first phase of discovery. Appellees devoted much of time at the trial court level
arguing that VTP products are insurance. This is a red herring. Even assuming VTP products
are 'insurance/' Appellants still did not engage in a common plan or scheme giving rise to
a cause of action by selling these policies. At all times relevant to this action, Midway,
MRM, and their finance managers had "limited lines" insurance licenses that allowed them
to sell these VTP products. Furthermore, the monetary benefits promised in the VTP
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programs were underwritten by qualified insurers licensed in Utah. Agents for the policy
administrators sell these same policies to dealerships throughout Utah and in eighteen
surrounding states.
In their certification Motion, Appellees analogized this case to Roy Veal v. Crown
Auto Dealerships, Inc., 236 F.R.D. 572 (M.D. Fla. 2006) and Violette v. PA, Days, Inc., 214
F.R.D. 207 (S.D. Ohio 2003). In both of these cases, the court certified class actions relating
to complaints about the defendants' standard procedures involved in selling VTP products.
These cases, however, are different from this case because they involve allegations that the
defendants engaged in deception and misrepresentation as a general policy in the sale of the
products.
In Roy Veal, for instance, the named plaintiff alleged that the car dealership "routinely
failed to make adequate disclosures concerning the sale of the product,... misled customers
as to the true benefit [the VTP product] provided, [and] failed to specify the premium paid
for the 'Etch' 6 product," 236 F.R.D. at 575-76. Similarly, in Violette, the named plaintiff
alleged that the car dealership automatically, and without disclosure to the customer, imposed
a charge for the VTP product with every automobile sale. 214 F.R.D. at 211,214.
By contrast, in this case Appellees have not alleged, nor could they allege, a common
plan or scheme of this sort. As demonstrated by the many named Appellees who did not have
a charge imposed for a VTP product-e.g., Elisha Dela Garza, Severo Rodriguez, Jodi Poll
Holbrook, Melissa Thomas, and Gregory Heiner- Midway and MRM do not have a policy
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or practice of automatically charging for VTP. Nor do Appellants fail to disclose the price
of VTP, as evidenced by the Motor Vehicle Contracts of Sale that clearly lists a price for any
VTP product purchased. Nor do Appellees allege that there were misrepresentations or
deceit in the way the VTP products were sold. Appellants simply sold common and accepted
VTP products to customers who wanted them, and were authorized to offer these products
by their "limited lines" insurance license. In addition, the products sold by MRM and
Midway were underwritten by insurance companies authorized to conduct business in Utah.
Appellees therefore have not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct giving
rise to a cause of action, and for this reason alone the Rule 23(a) requirements of
commonality and typicality are not met.
2.

An Individualized Inquiry Into Each Plaintiffs Claim Is
Required*

No issues of fact are common to all class members. While it is true that all the
proposed class members purchased VTP products, it is not true that all class members
purchased the same type of VTP product involving the same administrator with the same
underwriter. If certification is upheld on appeal, this case will "devolve into a series of
individual trials on issues peculiar to each [P]laintiff.n Zapata, 167 F.R.D. at 166. Appellees
contend that the dealerships are not authorized to sell VTP "insurance" policies and that VTP
policies promise monetary benefits from entities that are not approved as insurers in the state
of Utah.
Even assuming that these arguments merit further investigation, that investigation
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would require examination of each of the approximately 1700 sales of VTP and this
examination would involve a series of individualized questions for each Plaintiff because the
VTP products, contracts, terms, administrators, and underwriters varied from year to year.
Thus, to determine whether each product was legally sold, the following must be determined:
(A) Which type of VTP product was purchased? (B) From which dealership was it
purchased? (C) In what year was the VTP product purchased? (D) Who was the administrator
of the VTP program? (E) Did the administrator have an insurance underwriter for its VTP
product? (F) Who was the underwriter when the VTP product at issue was purchased? (G)
Was the underwriter licensed and registered with the state? (H) What were the terms of the
VTP product agreement? (I) Was the particular VTP contract registered with the State of
Utah? (J) What promises were contained in the particular VTP contract? (K) Did the terms
of the VTP contract include a monetary benefit? (L) Etc.
The tedious and time-consuming nature of nearly 1700 of these individualized
inquiries defeats any utility that the class action method could provide. The multitude of
factual variations illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality
are not met in this case and that even if the named Appellees were granted some relief by the
Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all members of the class because of their
disparate and individualized circumstances. Simply stated, adjudication of the claims of the
class representatives will not adjudicate the claims of the class members.
3.

Appellees Do Not Meet the Adequacy of Representation
Requirement of Rule 23(a).
56
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Appellees are not adequate representatives of the VTP classes because their interests
are not aligned with those of the putative class members. See Amchem Prods, v. Windsor,
521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997) ([A] class representative must be part of the class and possess
the same interest and suffer the same injury as class members.). Rule 23(a)(4) requires that
the plaintiffs provide Mfair and adequate protection for the interests of the class." Ditty, 182
F.R.D. at 642. "Two factors are important in that determination: (1) the class attorney's
qualifications, experience, and ability to conduct the litigation and (2) whether the named
plaintiffs have interests antagonistic to those of the class." Id. (emphasis added).
Appellees fail to address the interests of the named Appellees in relation to the
putative class, which is the second required factor. Because class representatives must be part
of a class, only the two named Appellees who actually purchased a VTP product, Dalton
Jaques and Nicholas Rodarte, may serve as class representatives. Mr. Jaques purchased a car
and a starter interrupt system from Midway in 2004. In the first set of contracts Jaques
signed, the system cost was listed as $3500; in the second set of contracts, the price was
reduced to $599.95. Mr. Rodarte purchased an acid etching system from MRM in 2004. Mr.
Rodarte was charged $299.95 forthe etching system. An examination of Mr. Jaques1 and Mr.
Rodarte's depositions raises serious doubts about the adequacy of their representation. Their
interests are antagonistic to those of the putative class members, for several different reasons.
Dalton Jaques. Mr. Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not
understand what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he
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is only concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. Mr. Jaques therefore is
only looking out for himself and is oblivious to the fact that he is purportedly representing
others. Mr. Jaques stated that his only concern is recovering money he allegedly lost by doing
business with Midway. This is antagonistic to the interests of putative class members who
need someone who is aware that there are other potential members of the class, and who is
willing to seek a different, class-wide form of relief as requested in the Complaint, such as
an injunction, rescission, and declaratory relief. Moreover, Mr. Jaques cannot represent VTP
purchasers from MRM as he had no dealings with MRM.
Nicholas Rodarte. Mr. Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not
possess the same interest as other Appellees in suing over VTP products. Although he stated
in his deposition that he was upset about being sold VTP, he did not say he was upset for any
of the reasons asserted in the Complaint- i.e., that VTP products are insurance, that
Appellants were not authorized the sell VTP, and that the VTP products were not
underwritten by qualified insurers. Rather, Mr. Rodarte alleged that the VTP product charge
was not disclosed to him and that if it had been disclosed, he would not have sued over VTP.
(ROA 1063). Again it should be noted that the charge for the VTP product was clearly listed
and identified as such on the sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed. Class members will not be
protected by Mr. Rodarte who does not even make the same allegations of wrongdoing as
Appellees. Moreover, Mr. Rodarte cannot represent the interests of Midway as he did not
conduct business with Midway.
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It appears that Appellees' counsel has located several individual plaintiffs who want
to pursue disparate consumer claims against Appellants and has named them as class
representatives, asserting claims he has fashioned. Given the inadequacy of representation
under Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure as set forth above, this Court should find
that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the VTP classes.
2.

Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

The district court erred in certifying the Doc Fees classes because Appellees failed to
show that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
a.

The Predominance Requirement Is Not Met Because Common
Questions of Law and Fact Are Not Present and Therefore Do Not
Predominate.

The predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. Appellees cannot meet the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a), because MRM and Midway did not engage in a common plan or scheme, and
individualized inquiries would have to be made into each Appellee's experience with being
sold a VTP product. Furthermore, the class representatives testimony demonstrates that he
class members are more interested in their individual claims and have little, if any, concern
for the claims being made in this Class Action. Because commonality is not demonstrated,
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the requirement of predominance is necessarily unmet. Class certification was thus improper.
b.

The Superiority Requirement Is Not Met Because the Named
Appellees Are Interested Only in Their Individual Claims, and a
Class Action Would Be Unmanageable.

Appellees must also demonstrate that a class action is "superior to, and not just as
good as, other available methods for handling the controversy." Wilcox Dev. Co. v. First
Interstate Bank, 97 F.R.D. 440, 444 (D, Ore. 1983). The first two of the four superiority
factors found in Rule 23(b) weigh in favor of a finding that superiority has not been met. A
court considering the "interests of individual members in controlling their own cases" must
"inform itself of any litigation actually pending by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at
444. As outlined above, in the initial Class Action Amended Complaint, Appellees asserted
twenty-five individual causes of action apart from the class claims, which were severed from
the class claims. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the class claims remain
certified and whether they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims. Appellees
have a strong interest in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual actions and lack
interest in or knowledge about the VTP class claims. When asked to describe their
grievances against Midway or MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences rather
than complaints relating to VTP products. Appellees' ignorance of class grievances
demonstrates that this putative class action is simply a collection of individual, unrelated
claims and experiences. The superiority factor is thus not satisfied.
Finally, the management of this class action will prove impossible, further precluding
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Appellees from ever meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees' certified classes relating
to VTP products encompass around 1700 car purchasers. Proving Appellees' claims would
require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of each VTP product
purchased. Accordingly, given the variety of deficiencies of the VTP classes in light of the
requirements of Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court should hold that the
trial court abused its discretion with regard to the certification of the VTP classes.
D.

Certification of the Guaranteed Automobile Protection ("GAP")
insurance classes was improper

Appellees' allegations of wrongdoing regarding GAP insurance are twofold. First,
Appellees claim the GAP insurance policies sold by Appellants promised monetary benefits
from entities not approved as insurers in the State of Utah, and second, the GAP policies
were sold on forms not approved by the State, These claims are not properly adjudicated as
a class since they do not comply with the requirements of Rule 23.
1.

Class Certification was improper because Appellees cannot Meet the
Commonality, Typicality, and Adequacy of Representation requirements
of Rule 23(a).

The district court erred in certifying the GAP insurance classes in this case since three
of the four Rule 23(a) requirements, specifically commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation, are not met. See Reed v. Bowen, 849 F.2d 1307,1310 (10th Cir. 1988).
A.

Lack of Commonality and Typicality.

Neither commonality nor typicality are met on the facts of this case. Appellees'
Complaint fails to adequately plead common plan or scheme of wrongdoing. In addition,
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these proposed classes are not certifiable because the factual and legal questions of the
Appellees vary according to each individual transaction with Appellants.
1.

Absence of a Common Plan or Scheme.

Appellees make the broad, conclusory allegation that Appellants engaged in a
common plan or scheme by selling GAP insurance that is not underwritten by qualified
insurers licensed with the state. As a preliminary matter, this allegation has no factual support
and is actually contrary to the facts developed during the first phase of discovery. There is
no allegation that the manner in which Appellants sold GAP insurance was underhanded or
shady or even unique from all other automobile dealers in Utah. Appellants in fact purchased
forms and information from agents of the administrators, whose policies are undisputedly
underwritten by qualified insurers. These agents sold these same policies to dealerships
throughout Utah and the surrounding states. Appellants then offer these policies, pursuant
to their "limited lines" licenses, to certain car buyers who, after being told about the products,
express an interest in purchasing them. The process is as simple and uneventful as that.
In their certification Motion, Appellees analogized this case to Johnson v. Rohr-Ville
Motors, Inc., 189 F.R.D. 363 (N.D. 111. 1999), in which the court certified a class action
involving alleged misrepresentations related to GAP insurance and other aspects of the
named plaintiffs vehicle purchase. Id at 366. The plaintiff in Johnson alleged that the GAP
insurance she bought was "totally worthless,11 and, by implication, the dealership knew it to
be worthless, because the particular exclusions of the GAP policy as applied to her vehicle
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purchase precluded her from recovering anything under the policy. Id. at 367. The plaintiff
in Johnson sought to certify a class of purchasers who suffered the same injury, i.e. those
who purchased GAP insurance policies containing exclusions that would render the policy
worthless in the circumstances of their vehicle purchase. Id.
In this case, unlike Johnson, Appellees have made no such allegations of deceit or
misrepresentation by Midway or MRM, nor could they make such allegations in good faith.
In addition to not alleging that Appellees sold a worthless product, as in Johnson, Appellees
do not allege, nor could they allege, that Appellants altered the administrators' forms or
created their own GAP insurance forms, deceived customers about the nature of the product,
or deceived customers about the type of insurance licenses that they hold. Appellees have
not alleged a common plan, scheme, or course of conduct giving rise to a cause of action.
The Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality are not met.
2.

An Individualized Inquiry Into Each Plaintiff s Claim Is
Required.

No issues of fact are common to all class members. While it is true that all the
proposed class members purchased GAP insurance, it is not true that all class members
purchased the same type of GAP insurance involving the same administrator with the same
underwriter on the same policy forms. The experiences of the Appellees are not similar to
each other, much less typical of the entire putative class. If certification is upheld on appeal,
this case will "devolve into a series of individual trials on issues peculiar to each [PJlaintiff."
Zapata, 167 F.R.D. at 166.
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Appellees acknowledge that Midway sold approximately 1543 GAP policies since
opening in 2000 and that MRM has sold approximately 1141 GAP policies since opening in
2004. Despite these numerous individual transactions, Appellees simply make the blanket
assertion that "all of Appellants' GAP insurance policies were sold in violation of Utah law."
Even assuming Appellees1 arguments merit further scrutiny, an investigation would require
examination of the more than 2600 individual sales of GAP insurance. At Midway, GAP
policies from at least eight different administrators were sold in different years during the
relevant time period. At MRM, GAP policies from at least four different administrators were
sold in different years during the relevant time period. Sometimes the administrator and the
insurer/underwriter were one and the same. Sometimes they were not. At both MRM and
Midway, even policies sold by the same administrator varied from year to year, as the terms
and the insurance underwriters would change. Thus, to determine the legality of each policy
sold, the trial court would have to determine: (A) When was the policy purchased? (B) From
which dealership was it purchased? (C) Who was the administrator of the GAP program? (D)
Was the program a "waiver" program or a traditional "insurance" program? (E) Did the
administrator have an insurance underwriter for its GAP product? (F) If so, who is the
underwriter? (G) Who was the underwriter when the policy at issue was purchased? (H) Is
the underwriter licensed and registered with the Commission? (I) What are the terms of the
GAP agreement? (J) Is the GAP agreement registered with the State of Utah? (K) Was the
underlying financing contract between the dealership and the purchaser assigned to a

64
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

third-party financial institution? (L) Who is considered the lender in this particular
transaction? (M) On what forms were the GAP policies issued? (N) Were the forms approved
by the State of Utah? (O) Etc.
The tedious and time-consuming nature of all of these individualized inquiries defeats
any utility that the class action method could provide. The Court need look no further than
the varying circumstances in which Appellees purchased GAP insurance to ascertain that this
case is not appropriate for certification. See Brooks v. S. Bell Tel & Tel Co., 133 F.R.D. 54,
57 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (where little commonality of fact exists between representative class
members, there is likely even more disparity among class as a whole).
For instance, Appellee Dalton Jaques purchased a used 2001 Toyota from Midway in
August 2004. His purchase was financed and his loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Auto
Finance, Inc. in conjunction with the purchase, he bought and financed an American Heritage
Insurance Services ("AHIS") "GAP Addendum" policy for $600. The AHIS policy has
always been underwritten by Allstate Insurance Company.
By contrast, Appellee Nicholas Rodarte purchased a used Volkswagen Passat from
Mike Riddle Mitsubishi in May 2004. His loan was assigned to Wells Fargo Auto Finance,
Inc. in conjunction with the purchase, he bought a Beacon Worldwide Industries GAP
"Deficiency Waiver Contract Addendum" policy for $500. Beacon has undergone several
changes in underwriters over the past few years.
The multitude of factual variations illustrate that the Rule 23(a) requirements of
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commonality and typicality are not met in this case, and that even if the named Appellees
were granted some relief by the Court, that relief could not automatically apply to all
members of the class because of their disparate and individualized circumstances.
Adjudication of the claims of the class representatives would not necessarily adjudicate the
claims of the class members.
B.

Appellees Do Not Meet the Adequacy of Representation
Requirement of Rule 23(a).

Appellees are not adequate representatives because their interests are not aligned with
those of the putative class. An examination of the named Appellees' depositions raises
serious doubts about the adequacy of representation. Appellees' interests are antagonistic to
those of the putative class members for varying reasons. Because class representatives must
be part of the class, only those named Appellees who purchased GAP insurance-Dalton
Jaques, Elisha Dela Garza, Severo Rodriguez, and Nicholas Rodarte-are discussed in this
section. All of these Appellees are inadequate representatives, for the following reasons:
First, the Appellees are primarily looking out for themselves and are, by and large,
without knowledge as to their representation of others. These Appellees' only concern is
recovering money they allegedly lost by doing business with Appellants. This is antagonistic
to the interests of putative class members as such representatives would be uninterested in
the alternate, class-wide forms of relief requested by the Complaint such as declaratory relief,
an injunction, or rescission. Furthermore, when asked to describe why they were unhappy
with Appellants, only one Appellee complained about being sold GAP insurance, and, as
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described below, his complaints did not describe the same interest as those of other class
members. Class members will not be protected by Appellees who do not share the same
interests and concerns relating to GAP insurance. The flaws and inadequacies of each
Plaintiff to be class representatives are illustrated below.
Dalton Jaques. Mr. Jaques is an inadequate class representative because he does not
understand what acting as a class representative entails. He testified in his deposition that he
is only concerned about his own claims, not the claims of the class. (ROA 1455).
Severo Rodriguez. Mr. Rodriguez is an inadequate class representative because
he did not complain about being charged for GAP insurance. He testified that his allegations
against Midway relate only to Midway incorrectly filling out documents.
Elisha Dela Garza. Ms. Dela Garza has no understanding of what being a class
representative entails, has no desire to act as a plaintiff in this case, and is only interested in
recovering the money she believes she lost. (ROA 1458-59). When asked why she was
unhappy with Midway, Ms. Dela Garza explained her allegation that Midway falsified
information about her grandfather on the sales contract and sold her a four-cylinder vehicle
instead of a six-cylinder vehicle. Ms. Dela Garza never mentioned being upset over GAP
insurance. Id.
Nicholas Rodarte. Mr. Rodarte is an inadequate representative because he does not
possess the same interest as the putative class in suing over GAP insurance. Although he
stated in his deposition that he was upset about GAP insurance, he did not say he was upset
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because the insurance was not underwritten by qualified insurers. (ROA 912-916). Rather,
Mr. Rodarte alleged that the GAP insurance charge was not disclosed to him and stated that
if it had been disclosed, he would not have sued. (ROA 912-916)5.
Given these Rule 23(a) deficiencies, the GAP classes should not have been certified.
2.

Class certification was improper because Appellees cannot meet the
Predominance and Superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3).

Certification under Rule 23(b)(3) was improper since Appellees are unable to show
that "questions of law or fact common to members of the class predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members" and that "a class action is superior to other
available methods for fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy." Utah R. Civ. P.
23(b)(3).
A.

The Predominance Requirement Is Not Met Because Common
Questions of Law and Fact Are Not Present and Therefore Do Not
Predominate.

As stated previously, predominance requirement is "far more demanding" than the
commonality requirement of Rule 23(a). Id. Appellees cannot meet the commonality
requirement of Rule 23(a), because MRM and Midway did not engage in a common plan or
scheme, and extensive individualized inquiries would have to be made into the purchase of
each Appellees GAP insurance policy. Furthermore, the class representatives testimony
demonstrates that the class members are more interested in their individual claims and have

5

Similar to the Doc Fee and VTP charges, the GAP insurance fee was clearly listed
and identified as such on the sales contract Mr. Rodarte signed.
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little, if any, concern for the claims being made by way of this Class Action.

Because

commonality is not demonstrated, the requirement of predominance is necessarily unmet.
Class certification is thus improper.
B.

The Superiority Requirement Is Not Met Because the Named
Appellees Are Interested Only in Their Individual Claims, and a
Class Action Would Be Unmanageable.

Appellees must also demonstrate that a class action is "superior to, and not just as
good as, other available methods for handling the controversy.11 Wilcox Dev. Co., 97 F.R.D.
at 444. Again, similar to the VTP classes, the first two of the four Rule 23(b) superiority
factors weigh in favor of a finding that superiority has not been met. A court considering the
"interests of individual members in controlling their own cases" must "inform itself of any
litigation actually pending by ... the individuals." Wilcox, 97 F.R.D. at 444. As stated above,
the Appellees' 25 individual claims have been separated out and will proceed independently
of the class action. Thus, Appellees already have litigation pending in this Court on their
numerous individual causes of action. These cases will proceed regardless of whether the
GAP claims are certified and they arise out of the same transactions as the class claims.
Appellees have a primary interest in pursuing their own claims in the severed individual
actions. By contrast, they lack interest in or knowledge about the class claims and seem to
have no idea what serving as a class representative entails. When asked to describe their
grievances against Midway or MRM, they describe their unique individual experiences and
do not express concerns over the class claims related to GAP insurance. The superiority
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factor is thus not satisfied.
Finally, the management of this class action would again prove difficult, further
precluding Appellees from meeting the superiority requirement. Appellees1 first proposed
class-all purchasers of GAP insurance from Midway-consists of approximately 1543
members; Appellees' second proposed class-all purchasers of GAP insurance from MRMconsists of approximately 1141 members. As described above, proving Appellees' claims
would require individualized inquiries into the peculiar circumstances of each and every
GAP insurance policy purchased, rendering this action unmanageable.
CONCLUSION
The lower court's ruling denying Appellants' Motion to Dismiss was in error and
should be reversed. No private right of action exists under Utah law to enforce provisions
of the Insurance Code.
Further, the lower court abused its discretion in certifying the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP
classes. Each certification fails, on multiple levels, to meet the requirements of Rule 23 of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The ruling of the lower court with regard to the
certification of the Doc Fee, VTP and GAP classes should also be reversed.
DATED this

day of June, 2009.
.C.
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31A-15-107

M much of the regulation provided by this title as is required 31A-15-104. Direct placement of insurance.
(1) Subject to this section, any person seeking insurance
.» a comparable policy written by an authorized foreign
may obtain it from an unauthorized insurer if no producer
»surer.
•ID (a) A surplus lines transaction in this state shall be resident doing business in Utah is involved and if negotiations
occur primarily outside Utah. Negotiations by mail occur
examined to determine whether it complies with:
(i) the surplus lines tax levied under Chapter 3, within Utah if a letter or other document containing insurance-related solicitations or negotiations is sent from or to a
Department Funding, Fees, and Taxes;
Utah address. Negotiations by telephone take place within
fii) the solicitation limitations of Subsection (3);
Utah if one of the parties to the conversation is in Utah.
(iii) the requirement of Subsection (3) that place(2) Each policyholder who procures or renews insurance
ment be through a surplus lines producer;
otherwise subject to this code from any insurer not authorized
(iv) placement limitations imposed under Subsec- to do business in Utah, other than insurance procured under
tions (6)(a), (b), and (c); and
Section 31A-15-103 and the renewal of guaranteed renewable
(v) the policy form requirements of Subsections (8) insurance lawfully issued outside Utah, shall within 60 days
and (10).
after the insurance is procured or renewed, report to the
(b) The examination described in Subsection (ll)(a) commissioner in the form required by the commissioner and
shall take place as soon as practicable after the transac- pay the taxes specified by Section 31A-3-301.
tion. The surplus lines producer shall submit to the
(3) (a) Any insurance on personal property sold on the
examiner information necessary to conduct the examinainstallment plan, under a conditional sales contract, or an
equivalent security agreement under the Uniform Comtion within a period specified by rule.
mercial Code which charges the buyer, as a part of the
(c) (i) The examination described in Subsection (11 Ma)
consideration in the agreement of sale for insurance on
may be conducted by the commissioner or by an
the property, shall be placed with an insurer authorized to
advisory organization created under Section 31 A-15do business in Utah.
111 and authorized by the commissioner to conduct
(b) Whenever the law of Utah requires a person to
these examinations. The commissioner is not repurchase
insurance on risks in Utah, it shall be obtained
quired to authorize an additional advisory organizafrom an insurer authorized to do business in Utah, or
tion to conduct an examination under this Subsection
under Section 31A-15-103.
2003
(ll)(e).
(ii) The commissioner's authorization of one or 31A-15-105. Effect of contracts illegal because insurer
was unauthorized.
more advisory organizations to act as examiners
(1) An insurance contract entered into in violation of this
under this Subsection (11 He) shall be:
chapter is unenforceable by, but enforceable against, the
(A) by rule; and
(B) evidenced by a contract, on a form pro- insurer. In an action against the insurer on the contract, the
vided by the commissioner, between the autho- insured is bound by the terms of the contract as affected by
rized advisory organization and the department. this title and rules adopted under this title.
(2) y\n insurance policy entered into in violation of this
(d) (i) (A) A person conducting the examination described in Subsection (ll)(a) shall collect a chapter is voidable by the policyholder who entered into the
stamping fee of an amount not to exceed 1% of transaction without knowing it was illegal. The policyholder
may avoid the contract by notice to the insurer, if no insured
the policy premium payable in connection with
has enforced the contract by an action under Subsection (1),
the transaction.
(B) A stamping fee collected by the commis- and may recover any consideration paid under the contract.
(3) Any person who assisted in the procurement of an
sioner shall be deposited in the General Fund.
illegal contract under this chapter, and who knew or should
(O) The commissioner shall establish a stamphave known the transaction was illegal, is liable to the insured
ing fee by rule.
for the full amount of a claim or loss payable under the
(ii) A stamping fee collected by an advisory orga- contract, if the insurer does not pay it. The receiver appointed
nization is the property of the advisory organization
under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act, may assert the
to be used in paying the expenses of the advisory claims of insureds if the insurer is the subject of a proceeding
organization.
under Chapter 27a.
2007
(iii) Liability for paying a stamping fee is as required under Subsection 31A-3-303U) for taxes im- 31A-15-106. Servicing of contracts made out of state.
( D A foreign insurer that does not have a certificate of
posed under Section 31A-3-301.
(iv) The commissioner shall adopt a rule dealing authority to do business in this state under Section 31A-14with the payment of stamping fees. If a stamping fee 202 may, in this state, collect premiums and adjust losses and
do all other acts reasonably incidental to contracts made
is not paid when due, the commissioner or advisory
organization may impose a penalty of 25% of the outside this state without violating this chapter. Any premiums collected under this section are subject to Section 31A-3stamping fee due, plus l-¥i% per month from the
time of default until full payment of the stamping fee. 301.
(2) Subsection (1) does not permit a renewal, extension,
(v) A stamping fee relative to a policy covering a
increase, or other substantial change in the terms of any
risk located partially in this state shall be allocated in
the same manner as under Subsection 31A-3-303(4). contract under Subsection (1) unless:
(a) it is permitted under Section 31A-15-103;
(e) The commissioner, representatives of the depart(b) the contract is for life or accident and health insurment, advisory organizations, representatives and memance or annuities; or
bers of advisory organizations, authorized insurers, and
(c) a rule adopted by the commissioner permits this
surplus lines insurers are not liable for damages on
action when the interests of the policyholder and the
account of statements, comments, or recommendations
public appear to be sufficiently protected.
2001
made in good faith in connection with their duties under
this Subsection (ll)(e) or under Section 31A-15-111.
31A-15-107. Defense of action by unauthorized person.
(f) An examination conducted under this Subsection
(1) Except under Subsection (3), no pleading, notice, order,
W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
(11) and a document or materialsDigitized
related by
tothe
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31A-14-214. Amendment to articles and notice of corporate reorganization.
Sections 16-10a-1001 through 16-10a-1004 apply when a
foreign insurer amends its articles of incorporation. If a
foreign insurer plans to undergo any corporate reorganization
of the kinds dealt with in Chapter 5, Part 5, Corporate
Reorganization, the insurer shall notify the commissioner in
writing, at the same time that the first formal step of the
statutory procedure for achieving the reorganization is taken
in the domiciliary jurisdiction or elsewhere. The insurer shall
provide the details required by the commissioner, whether by
rule or order.
2004
31A-14-215. Assessment by foreign company.
Every foreign mutual insurer authorized in this state shall
notify the commissioner immediately after making an assessment upon any of its members in this state. The insurer shall
attach to the notice a statement of the condition of the insurer,
giving the facts showing the necessity for the assessment.
Unless the commissioner orders otherwise under a Chapter
27, Part 5, Administrative Actions, proceeding, a foreign
mutual insurer authorized in this state may not make or
increase any assessment because of its inability to collect
assessments from its members in other states.
2007
31A-14-216. Release from regulation.
(1) A foreign insurer authorized under this chapter is
subject to regulation under the applicable provisions of the
Insurance Code, unless it is released from regulation under
this section.
(2) A foreign insurer may apply for release from regulation
by filing with the commissioner:
(a) its certificate of authority;
(b) a schedule of its outstanding liabilities from policies
issued in this state to residents of Utah or on risks located
in Utah, and from other business transactions in Utah;
(c) a plan for securing the discharge of those outstanding liabilities; and
(d) any other information as reasonably required by
the commissioner.
(3) The commissioner shall promptly release the insurer
from regulation if he finds all the following:
(a) The insurer has stopped doing any new business in
Utah.
(b) The discharge of existing liabilities to creditors in
Utah is sufficiently secured.
(c) The release would not otherwise be prejudicial to
the interests of insureds or creditors in Utah or, if the
insurer is an alien insurer and Utah is the state of entry
into the United States, of all insureds and creditors in the
United States.
(4) Before deciding on the release, the commissioner may
require the insurer to notify, at its own expense, all agents or
other classes of potentially interested persons in a manner the
commissioner prescribes, including publication of its withdrawal from Utah. The notice shall advise affected persons to
communicate to the commissioner any objections they may
have to the insurer's release from regulation.
(5) As a prerequisite for releasing the insurer, the commissioner may require a deposit under Section 31A-2-206, a bond
issued by a surety authorized in Utah, or other appropriate
security or reinsurance in a sufficient amount to secure the
proper discharge of the insurer's remaining liabilities in Utah.
The commissioner may also require the insurer to sign an
agreement to remain subject to the jurisdiction of the commissioner and the courts of Utah with respect to any matter
arising out of business done in Utah prior to the release.
1985

31A-14-217. Revocation of certificate of authority.
Whenever there would be grounds for delinquency proceedings under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act, against a

foreign insurer, if the foreign insurer were a domestic insurer,
the commissioner may, after any proceeding authorized by
Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative Procedures Act, revoke,
suspend, or limit the foreign insurer's certificate of authority.
This action does not affect insurance which has already been
issued. The insurer remains subject to regulation until released under Section 31A-14-216.
2008
CHAPTER 15
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS, SURPLUS LINES, AND
RISK RETENTION GROUPS
Part 1
Unauthorized Insurers and Surplus Lines
Section
31A-15-101.
31A-15-102.
31A-15-103.
31A-15-104.
31A-15-105.
31A-15-106.
31A-15-107.
31A-15-108.
31A-15-109.
31A-15-110.
31A-15-111.

Purposes.
Assisting unauthorized insurers.
Surplus lines insurance — Unauthorized insurers.
Direct placement of insurance.
Effect of contracts illegal because insurer was
unauthorized.
Servicing of contracts made out of state.
Defense of action by unauthorized person.
Attorney fees.
Investigation and disclosure of insurance contracts.
Reporting of illegal insurance.
Surplus lines advisory organizations.
Part 2
Risk Retention Groups

31A-15-201.
31A-15-202.
31A-15-203.
31 A-15-204.

31A-15-205.
31A-15-206.
31A-15-207.
31A-15-208.
31 A-15-209.
31A-15-210.
31A-15-211.
31A-15-212.
31A-15-213.
31A-15-214.

Short title.
Definitions.
Risk retention groups chartered in this state.
Risk retention groups not chartered in this
state — Designation of commissioner as
agent — Compliance with unfair claims settlement practices act — Deceptive, false, or
fraudulent practices — Examination regarding financial condition — Prohibitions —
Penalties — Operation prior to enactment of
this part.
Guaranty associations.
Repealed.
Purchasing groups — Exemption from certain
laws.
Purchasing groups — Filing and registration
requirements.
Restrictions on purchasing groups.
Purchasing group taxation.
Enforcement authority.
Duty of producers to obtain license — Risk
retention groups — Purchasing groups.
Effect of orders issued in U.S. District Court.
Severability.
PARTI

UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS AND SURPLUS LINES
31A-15-101. Purposes.
It is the purpose of this chapter to:
(1) prevent evasion by unauthorized insurers of the
regulatory and tax laws of Utah and protect Utah and its
residents against loss from that type of evasion;
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(2) subject unauthorized insurers and other persons
doing an insurance business in Utah to the jurisdiction of
the Utah commissioner and courts;
(3) protect authorized insurers from unfair competition
by unauthorized insurers; and
(4) provide an orderly method, under reasonable and
practical safeguards, for procuring insurance from unauthorized insurers.
1985

31A-15-103

a risk located in this state, subject to the limitations and
requirements of this section.
(2) (a) For a contract made under this section, the insurer
may, in this state:
(i) inspect the risks to be insured;
(ii) collect premiums;
(iii) adjust losses; and
(iv) do another act reasonably incidental to the
contract,
:UA-15-102. Assisting unauthorized insurers.
(b) An act described in Subsection (2)(a) may be done
(1) No person may do any act enumerated under Subsection
through:
''.U who knows or should know that the act may assist in the
(i) an employee; or
illegal placement of insurance with an unauthorized insurer
(ii) an independent contractor.
nr the subsequent servicing of an insurance policy illegally
(3) (a) Subsections (1) and (2) do not permit a person to
placed with an unauthorized insurer.
solicit business in this state on behalf of an insurer that
(2) An act performed by mail is performed both at the place
has no certificate of authority.
M{ mailing and at the place of delivery. Any of the following
(b) Insurance placed with a nonadmitted insurer shall
acts, whether performed by mail or otherwise, fall within the
be placed with a surplus lines producer licensed under
prohibition of Subsection (1):
Chapter 23a, Insurance Marketing — Licensing Produc(a) soliciting, making, or proposing to make an insurers, Consultants, and Reinsurance Intermediaries.
ance contract;
(c) The commissioner may by rule prescribe how a
(b) taking, receiving, or forwarding an application for
surplus lines producer may:
insurance;
(i) pay or permit the payment, commission, or
(c) collecting or receiving, in full or in part, an insurother remuneration on insurance placed by the surance premium;
plus lines producer under authority of the surplus
(d) issuing or delivering an insurance policy or other
lines producer's license to one holding a license to act
evidence of an insurance contract except as a messenger
as an insurance producer; and
not employed by the insurer, or an insurance producer;
(ii) advertise the availability of the surplus lines
(e) doing any of the following in connection with the
producer's services in procuring, on behalf of a person
solicitation, negotiation, procuring, or effectuation of inseeking insurance, a contract with a nonadmitted
surance coverage for another: inspecting risks, setting
insurer.
rates, advertising, disseminating information, or advising
(4) For a contract made under this section, a nonadmitted
on risk management;
insurer is subject to Sections 31A-23a-402 and 31A-23a-403
(f) publishing or disseminating any advertisement en- and the rules adopted under those sections.
couraging the placement or servicing of insurance thai?
(5) A nonadmitted insurer may not issue workers' compenwould violate vSubscction (1); however this provision does sation insurance coverage to an employer located in this state,
not apply to publication or dissemination to an audience except for stop loss coverage issued to an employer securing
primarily outside Utah that also reaches persons in Utah workers'compensation under Subsection 34A-2-20K3).
unless the extension to persons inside Utah can be con(6) (a) The commissioner may by rule prohibit making a
veniently avoided without substantial expense other than
contract under Subsection (1) for a specified class of
loss of revenue; nor does it apply to regional or national
insurance if authorized insurers provide an established
network programs on radio or television unless they
market for the class in this state that is adequate and
originate in Utah;
reasonably competitive.
(b) The commissioner may by rule place a restriction or
(g) investigating, settling, adjusting, or litigating
a limitation on and create special procedures for making a
claims; or
contract under Subsection (1) for a specified class of
(h) representing or assisting any person to do an uninsurance if:
authorized insurance business or to procure insurance
(i) there have been abuses of placements in the
from an unauthorized insurer.
class; or
(3) Subsection (1) does not prohibit:
(ii) the policyholders in the class, because of lim(a) an attorney acting for a client;
ited financial resources, business experience, or
(b) a full-time salaried employee of an insured acting in
knowledge, cannot protect their own interests adethe capacity of an insurance buyer or manager; or
quately.
(c) insurance activities described under Section 31A(c) The commissioner may prohibit an individual in15-103.
surer from making a contract under Subsection (1) and all
(4) Any act performed in Utah which is prohibited under
insurance producers from dealing with the insurer if:
this section constitutes appointment of the commissioner or
(i) the insurer willfully violates:
the lieutenant governor as agent for service of process under
(A) this section;
Sections 31A-2-309 and 31A-2-310.
(B) Section 31A-4-102, 31A-23a-402, or 31A(5) Any person or entity who knows or should know that the
26-303: or
person's or entity's actions assist in the illegal placement of
(C) a rule adopted under a section listed in
insurance in violation of this section is guilty of a third degree
Subsection (6Kc)(i)(A) or (B);
felony.
2005
(ii) the insurer fails to pay the fees and taxes
31A-15-103. Surplus lines insurance — Unauthorized
specified under Section 31A-3-301; or
insurers.
(iii) the commissioner has reason to believe that
(1) Notwithstanding Section 31A-15-102, a foreign insurer
the insurer is:
that has not obtained a certificate of authority to do business
(A) in an unsound condition;
in this state under Section 31A-14-202
may
negotiate
for and
Digitized by the
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Law Library, J. Reuben Clark
School, BYU.
(B) Law
operated
in a fraudulent, dishonest, or
make an insurance contract with a person in Machine-generated
this state and onOCR, may contain errors.
incompetent manner; or

31A-2-201

INSURANCE CODE

(a) in Salt Lake City; and
(b) elsewhere, if approved by the governor as necessary
for the efficient operation of the department.
(2) The commissioner shall, in accordance with the rules of
the Department of Administrative Services or other applicable
laws, procure or obtain access to all materials, supplies, and
equipment necessary for the efficient operation of the Insurance Department, including reasonable library facilities and
books.
1985
PART 2
DUTIES AND POWERS OF COMMISSIONER

190

(A) the availability and marketing of individual and group products;
(B) rate charges;
(C) coverage and demographic changes;
(D) benefit trends;
(E) market share changes; and
(F) accessibility;
(ii) assess complaint ratios and trends within the
health insurance market, which assessment shall
integrate complaint data from the Office of Consumer
Health Assistance within the department;
(iii) contain recommendations for action to improve the overall effectiveness of the health insurance
market, administrative rules, and statutes; and
(iv) include claims loss ratio data for each insurance company doing business in the state,
(c) When preparing the evaluation required by this
Subsection (7), the commissioner may seek the input of
insurers, employers, insured persons, providers, and others with an interest in the health insurance market.

31A-2-201. General duties and powers.
(1) The commissioner shall administer and enforce this
title.
(2) The commissioner has all powers specifically granted,
and all further powers that are reasonable and necessary to
enable the commissioner to perform the duties imposed by this
title.
2008
(3) (a) The commissioner may make rules to implement the
provisions of this title according to the procedures and 31A-2-201.1. General filing r e q u i r e m e n t s .
requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah AdministraExcept as otherwise provided in this title, the commissioner
tive Rulemaking Act.
may set by rule made in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3,
(b) In addition to the notice requirements of Section Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, specific requirements
63G-3-301, the commissioner shall provide notice under for filing any of the following required by this title:
Section 31A-2-303 of hearings concerning insurance de(1) a form;
partment rules.
(2) a rate; or
(4) (a) The commissioner shall issue prohibitory, manda(3) a report.
2008
tory, and other orders as necessary to secure compliance
with this title. An order by the commissioner is not 31A-2-202. Reports and replies.
1
effective unless the order:
(1) When relevant, either directly or indirectly, to the performance of the commissioner's duties under this title, the
(i) is in writing; and
(ii) is signed by the commissioner or under the commissioner may require from any person subject to regulation under this title:
commissioner's authority
(a) in whatever reasonable form and reasonable inter(b) On request of any person who would be affected by
vals the commissioner designates:
an order under Subsection (4)(a), the commissioner may
(i) a statement;
issue a declaratory order to clarify the person's rights or
(ii) a report;
duties.
(iii) an answer to a questionnaire;
(5) (a) The commissioner may hold informal adjudicative
(iv) other information; and
proceedings and public meetings, for the purpose of:
(v) evidence of the information described in Sub(i) investigation;
sections (l)(a)(i) through (iv);
(ii) ascertainment of public sentiment; or
(b) full explanation of the programming of any data
(iii) informing the public.
storage or communication system in use;
(b) An effective rule or order may not result from
(c) information from books, records, electronic data
informal hearings and meetings unless the requirement
processing systems, computers, or any other information
of a hearing under this section is satisfied.
storage system be made available to the department:
(6) The commissioner shall inquire into violations of this
(i) at any reasonable time; and
title and may conduct any examinations and investigations of
(ii) in any reasonable manner; and
insurance matters, in addition to examinations and investiga(d) timely delivery to the National Association of Insurtions expressly authorized, that the commissioner considers
ance Commissioners or other entity that gathers insurproper to determine:
ance industry information, a copy of the statistical data
(a) whether or not any person has violated any proviprepared for and submitted to the department, as specision of this title; or
fied by the commissioner.
(b) to secure information useful in the lawful adminis(2) (a) Subject to the requirements of this Subsection (2),
tration of this title.
the commissioner may:
(7) (a) Each year, the commissioner shall:
(i) prescribe forms for the information under Sub(i) conduct an evaluation of the state's health insection (1); and
surance market;
(ii) specify who shall execute or certify the infor(ii) report the findings of the evaluation to the
mation under Subsection (1).
Health and Human Services Interim Committee be(b) The forms prescribed under this Subsection (2)
fore October 1; and
shall be consistent, to the extent practicable, with those
(iii) publish the findings of the evaluation on the
prescribed by other jurisdictions.
department website,
(c) The commissioner shall use the annual statement
(b) The evaluation required by Subsection (7)(a) shall:
forms developed by the National Association of Insurance
(i) analyze the effectiveness of the insurance reguCommissioners for:
lations and statutes
in promoting
a healthy,
competDigitized
by the Howard
W. Hunter
Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
(i) basic financial data; and
itive health insurance market that Machine-generated
meets the needs of
OCR, may contain errors.
(ii) market regulation analysis.
Utahns by assessing such things as:
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immediately terminates the relationship with the
other person,
(d) (i) Neither the commissioner nor an examiner may
remove an account, record, file, document, evidence of
a transaction, or other property of the examinee from
the examinee's offices unless:
(A) the examinee consents in writing; or
(B) a court grants permission.
(ii) The commissioner may make and remove a
copy or abstract of the following described in Subsection (l)(d)(i):
(A) an account;
(B) a record;
(C) a file;
(D) a document;
(E) evidence of a transaction; or
(F) other property.
(2) (a) Subject to the other provisions of this section, the
commissioner shall examine as needed and as otherwise
provided by law:
(i) every insurer, both domestic and nondomestic;
(ii) every licensed rate service organization; and
(iii) any other licensee.
(b) The commissioner shall examine an insurer, both
domestic and nondomestic, no less frequently than once
every five years, but the commissioner may use in lieu an
examination under Subsection (4) to satisfy this requirement.
2006
(c) The commissioner shall revoke the certificate of
authority of an insurer or the license of a rate service
31A-2-203. Examinations and alternatives.
organization that has not been examined, or submitted an
(1) (a) Whenever the commissioner determines that inforacceptable in lieu report under Subsection (4), within the
mation is needed about a matter related* to the enforcepast five years.
ment of this title, the commissioner may examine the
affairs and condition of:
(d) (i) Any 25 persons who are policyholders, shareholders, or creditors of a domestic insurer may by
Ci) a licensee under this title;
verified petition demand a hearing under Section
(ii) an applicant for a license under this title;
31A-2-301 to determine whether the commissioner
(iii) a person or organization of persons doing or in
should conduct an unscheduled examination of the
process of organizing to do an insurance business in
insurer.
this state; or
(ii) Persons demanding the hearing under this
(iv) a person who is not, but should be, licensed
Subsection (2)(d) shall be given an opportunity in the
under this title.
hearing to present evidence that an examination of
(b) When reasonably necessary for an examination
the insurer is necessary.
under Subsection (l)(a), the commissioner may examine:
(iii) If the evidence justifies an examination, the
(i) so far as it relates to the examinee, an account,
commissioner shall order an examination.
record, document, or evidence of a transaction of:
(e) (i) If the board of directors of a domestic insurer
(A) the insurer or other licensee;
requests that the commissioner examine the insurer,
(B) an officer or other person who has executhe commissioner shall examine the insurer as soon
tive authority over or is in charge of any segment
as reasonably possible.
of the examinee's affairs; or
(ii) If the examination requested under this Sub(C) an affiliate of the examinee; or
section (2)(e) is conducted within two years after
(ii) a third party model or product used by the
completion of a comprehensive examination by the
examinee.
commissioner, costs of the requested examination
(c) (i) On demand, an examinee under Subsection
may not be deducted from premium taxes under
(l)(a) shall make available to the commissioner for
Section 59-9-102 unless the commissioner's order
examination:
specifically provides for the deduction.
(A) the examinee's own account, record, file,
(f) A bail bond surety company, as defined in Section
document, or evidence of a transaction; and
31A-35-102, is exempt from:
(B) to the extent reasonably necessary for an
(i) the five-year examination requirement in Subexamination, an account, record, file, document,
section (2Kb);
or evidence of a transaction of a person described
(ii) the revocation under Subsection (2)(c); and
under Subsection (1Kb).
(iii) Subsections (2)(d) and (2)(e).
(ii) Except as provided in Subsection (l)(c)(iii),
(3) (a) The commissioner may order an independent audit
failure to make an item described in Subsection
or examination by one or more technical experts, includ(l)(c)(i) available is concealment of records under
ing a certified public accountant or actuary:
Subsection 31A-27a-207(l)(e).
(i) in lieu of all or part of an examination under
(iii) If the examinee is unable to obtain an account,
Subsection (1) or (2); or
record, file, document, or evidence of a transaction
(ii) in addition to an examination under Subsecfrom a person described under Subsection (l)(b), that
tion (1)Clark
or (2).
failure is not concealment
of records
if theW.examinee
Digitized
by the Howard
Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU.
(3) (a) Subject to the requirements of this Subsection (3),
the commissioner may prescribe reasonable minimum
standards and techniques of accounting and data handling to ensure that timely and reliable information exists
and can be made available.
(b) The standards and techniques prescribed under
this Subsection (3) shall be consistent, to the extent
practicable, with those prescribed by other states.
(4) (a) A person listed in Subsection (4)(b) shall reply
promptly in writing or in other designated form to a
reasonable written inquiry from the commissioner.
(b) This Subsection (4) applies to any person with
executive authority over or in charge of any segment of
the affairs of:
(i) an insurer authorized to do or doing an insurance business in this state;
(ii) the affiliate of an insurer authorized to do or
doing an insurance business in this state; and
(iii) any other person licensed under this title.
(5) The commissioner may:
(a) require that any communication made under this
section be verified; and
(b) specify by whom a communication shall be verified.
(6) All information submitted to the commissioner shall be
accurate and complete.
(7) In the absence of actual malice, no communication to the
commissioner required by law or by the commissioner subjects
the person making it to an action for damages for defamation.
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(c) The examiner in charge shall give the examinee a
copy of the order issued under this Subsection (1).
(d) (i) The commissioner may alter the scope or nature
of an examination at any time without advance notice
to the examinee.
(ii) If the commissioner amends an order described
in this Subsection (1), the commissioner shall provide
a copy of any amended order to the examinee.
(e) Statements in the commissioner's examination order concerning examination scope are for the examiner's
guidance only.
(f) Examining relevant matters not mentioned in an
order issued under this Subsection (1) is not a violation of
this title.
(2) The commissioner shall, whenever practicable, cooperate with the insurance regulators of other states by conducting
joint examinations of:
(a) multistate insurers doing business in this state; or
(b) other multistate licensees doing business in this
state.
(3) An examiner authorized by the commissioner shall,
when necessary to the purposes of the examination, have
access at all reasonable hours to the premises and to any
books, records, files, securities, documents, or property of:
(a) the examinee; and
(b) any of the following if the premises, books, records,
files, securities, documents, or property relate to the
affairs of the examinee:
(i) an officer of the examinee;
(ii) any other person who:
(A) has executive authority over the examinee; or
(B) is in charge of any segment of the examinee's affairs; or
(iii) any affiliate of the examinee under Subsection
31A-2-203(l)(b).
(4) (a) The officers, employees, and agents of the examinee
and of persons under Subsection 31A-2-203(l)(b) shall
comply with every reasonable request of the examiners
for assistance in any matter relating to the examination.
(b) A person may not obstruct or interfere with the
examination except by legal process.
(5) If the commissioner finds the accounts or records to be
inadequate for proper examination of the condition and affairs
of the examinee or improperly kept or posted, the commissioner may employ experts to rewrite, post, or balance the
accounts or records at the expense of the examinee.
(6) (a) The examiner in charge of an examination shall
make a report of the examination no later than 60 days
after the completion of the examination that shall include:
(i) the information and analysis ordered under
Subsection (1); and
(ii) the examiner's recommendations.
(b) At the option of the examiner in charge, preparation
of the report may include conferences with the examinee
or representatives of the examinee.
(c) The report is confidential until the report becomes a
31A-2-203.5. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings.
public document under Subsection (7), except the commisThe commissioner of insurance shall comply with the prosioner may use information from the report as a basis for
cedures and requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Adminisaction under Chapter 27a, Insurer Receivership Act.
trative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings. 2008
(7) (a) The commissioner shall serve a copy of the examination report described in Subsection (6) upon the exam31A-2-204. Conducting examinations.
inee.
(1) (a) For each examination under Section 31A-2-203, the
(b) Within 20 days after service, the examinee shall:
commissioner shall issue an order:
(i) accept the examination report as written; or
(i) stating the scope of the examination; and
(ii) request agency action to modify the examina(ii) designating Digitized
the examiner
in
charge,
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben
Law School, BYU.
tion Clark
report.
(b) The commissioner need not give Machine-generated
advance notice of
OCR, may contain
errors.
(c) The
report is considered accepted under this Suban examination to an examinee.
(b) An audit or evaluation under this Subsection (3) is
subject to Subsection (5), Section 31A-2-204, and Subsection 31A-2-205(4).
(4) (a) In lieu of all or a part of an examination under this
section, the commissioner may accept the report of an
examination made by:
(i) the insurance department of another state; or
(ii) another government agency in:
(A) this state;
(B) the federal government; or
(C) another state.
(b) An examination by the commissioner under Subsection (1) or (2) or accepted by the commissioner under this
Subsection (4) may use:
(i) an audit already made by a certified public
accountant; or
(ii) an actuarial evaluation made by an actuary
approved by the commissioner.
(5) (a) An examination may be comprehensive or limited
with respect to the examinee's affairs and condition. The
commissioner shall determine the nature and scope of
each examination, taking into account all relevant factors, including:
(i) the length of time the examinee has been licensed in this state;
(ii) the nature of the business being examined;
(iii) the nature of the accounting or other records
available;
(iv) one or more reports from:
(A) independent auditors; and
(B) self-certification entities; and
(v) the nature of examinations performed elsewhere,
(b) The examination of an alien insurer is limited to
one or more insurance transactions and assets in the
United States, unless the commissioner orders otherwise
after finding that extraordinary circumstances necessitate a broader examination.
(6) To effectively administer this section, the commissioner:
(a) shall:
(i) maintain one or more effective financial condition and market regulation surveillance systems including:
(A) financial and market analysis; and
(B) a review of insurance regulatory information system reports;
(ii) employ a priority scheduling method that focuses on insurers and other licensees most in need of
examination; and
(iii) use examination management techniques similar to those outlined in the Financial Condition
Examination Handbook of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners; and
(b) in accordance with Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah
Administrative Rulemaking Act, may make rules pertaining to a financial condition and market regulation surveillance system.
2008

199

INSURANCE CODE

ing costs, which the commissioner may do if he had
reasonable cause to believe that the order which
issued or might have issued was necessary.
(3) Whenever the commissioner is reimbursed for costs
under this section, the expenditures shall not be charged
against the department budget.
1987
31A-2-302. Commissioner's disapproval.
(1) When the law requires the commissioner's approval for
a certain action without a deemer clause, that approval must
be express. The commissioner's disapproval of an action is
assumed if the commissioner does not act within 60 days after
receiving the application for approval or give notice of the
commissioner's reasonable extension of that time period with
the commissioner's reasons for the extension. Assumed disapproval under this subsection entitles the aggrieved person to
request agency action under Section 63G-4-201.
(2) When the law provides that a certain action is not
effective if disapproved by the commissioner within a certain
period, the affirmative approval by the commissioner may
make the action effective at a designated earlier date, but not
earlier than the date of the commissioner's affirmative approval.
(3) Subsections (1) and (2) do not apply to the extent that
the law specifically provides otherwise.
2008
31A-2-303. Notice.
(1) If the commissioner determines that the number of
persons affected by a proposed action is so great as to render
it impracticable to serve each person affected with a copy of an
order, notice of hearing, or other notice, the commissioner
shall:
(a) provide a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or
other notice to all persons who have filed with the
department a general request to be informed of this type
of action, or if fewer than ten persons have requested this
type of notice, provide a copy to those who have and aWo
to others affected by the notice or order so that at least ten
persons receive the notice or order who are collectively
representative of the class of persons whose legal status,
pecuniary interests, or other substantial interests will be
affected by the proposed action; and
(b) publish a copy of the order, notice of hearing, or
other notice under Subsection (2).
(2) When this title requires the commissioner to publish an
order, notice of hearing, or other document in newspapers, the
commissioner shall cause the notice or order to be published at
least once during each of the four weeks preceding the
hearing, effective date, or other critical event, in at least two
newspapers with sufficient circulation and appropriate location to best provide actual notice.
1987

31A-2-307

privilege against self-incrimination, testimony and evidence
from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77.
Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity.
(2) If a person claims the privilege against self-incrimination and refuses to appear, testify, or produce documents in
response to probative evidence against him in a proceeding tc
revoke or suspend his license, and if the testimony or documents would have been admissible as evidence in a court o1
law except for the Fifth Amendment privilege, the refusal tc
appear, testify, or produce documents is, for noncriminal
proceedings only, rebuttable evidence of the facts on which the
proceeding is based.
199".
31A-2-306. Judicial review — Costs.
(1)A person aggrieved by a rule or order of the commis
sioner, or aggrieved by the commissioner's failure to act wher
he has a duty to act, may obtain judicial review.
(2) The court reviewing agency actions governed by thi*
title shall give priority to those actions and shall hear am
determine them promptly
(3) Costs shall be awarded as in civil cases. If the court finds
that the appeal from action or inaction stemmed from the bac
faith or malice of the commissioner, the court may aware
reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing petitioner. Sectior
63G-7-701 applies to the extent the attorney's fees awardec
under this subsection exceed $10,000 for any one appeal.
200.

31 A-2-306.5. Stay of commissioner's decision pending
administrative review or judicial appeal.
(1) An order of the commissioner or a designee of tru
commissioner is not stayed by a petition for:
(a) administrative review;
(b) rehearing; or
(c) judicial review.
(2) A person seeking to stay an order of the commissioner o:
a designee of the commissioner shall seek a stay in accordano
with:
(a) rules made by the commissioner in accordance witl
Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemakini
Act, pending a petition for:
(i) administrative review; or
(ii) rehearing; or
(b) Section 63G-4-405, pending judicial review.
200

31A-2-307. Declaratory interpretation of statutes Procedure.
(1) The commissioner or any other person with a substan
tial interest in the result may petition the Third District Cour
for Salt Lake County for a declaratory judgment interpretin
any provision of this title as applied to stipulated facts.
(2) The court may require that notice be given to person
31A-2-304. Auxiliary procedural powers.
The commissioner, or his delegate authorized for a particu- that may be affected by the judgment. These persons ma
lar matter over his handwritten signature, may administer participate in the proceeding.
(3) The court in its discretion may require the commit
oaths, take testimony, issue subpoenas, and take depositions
sioner
and any other participating parties to provide test:
in connection with any hearing, meeting, examination, investigation, or other proceeding that the commissioner may mony and documentary evidence necessary for a fair dispos:
conduct. The subpoena shall have the same effect and shall be tion of the case.
(4) The court may decline to proceed on the petition if i
served in the same manner as if issued from a court of record.
Sections 78B-1-131 and 78B-6-313 apply to the enforcement of believes the petition is frivolous, or the declaratory relief i
the process issued by the commissioner or his delegate. 2008 unnecessary or has the possibility of prejudicing persons wb
cannot practicably be made parties to the proceeding.
(5) The court may declare the meaning of the statute. Th
31A-2-305. Immunity from prosecution.
(1) If a natural person declines to appear, testify, or produce declaration has the effect of a final judgment or decree.
(6) Any participating party may obtain judicial review <
any record or document in any proceeding instituted by the
commissioner or in obedience to the subpoena of the commis- the decision.
(7) The costs of the proceeding shall be paid by the pet
sioner, the commissioner may apply to a judge of the district
court where the proceeding is held for an order to the person tioner unless the commissioner is the petitioner, in which cas
to attend, testify, or produce records or documents as re- all parties shall bear their own costs. "Costs" means:
Digitized
the Howard
W. Hunter
Law aLibrary, J. Reuben
Clark
BYU.marshal;
quested by the commissioner.
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FOLLOW-UP STATEMENT TO INSURANCE CODE
TASK FORCE
September 3, 1985
RE:

Chapter 15, Unauthorized Insurers
and Surplus Lines

Clark B. Fetzer, Assistant Attorney General, submits
this follow-up statement on behalf of the Insurance Departments
The Department supports adoption of the amendments
proposed in Exhibits D-l through D-3, E, and F, to the statement
of Alan J. Maguire of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Leiby & MacRae«

There is a

particular need for the amendment proposed in Exhibit D-l, which
sets specific financial standards for unauthorized insurers with
which a broker may place insurance.

Hy first reading of sub-

sections 5 and 6 of section 31A-15-103 alerted me to the need for
more definite standards*

Please note that the version of the

amendments to this section proposed by the Insurance Department
contains a subparagraph (b) which was omitted in Exhibit D-l*
That subparagraph immediately follows subparagraph (6) (a) Ci) , and
is as follows:
(b) No surplus lines broker may, either
knowingly or without reasonable investigation
of the financial condition and general reputation of the insurer, place insurance under
this section with insurers not satisfying the
above requirements or with insurers engaging
in unfair practices, or with otherwise substandard insurers, without giving the applicant notice in writing of the known deficiencies of the insurer or the limitations on his

i
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investigation, and explaining the need to
place the business with such an insurer.
Copies of such notices shall be kept in the
office of the broker for at least five years.
Insurers on the "doubtful" list under subsection (6) (d) of this section and insurers not
qualifying under subsections (i) to (iii) of
this subsection or not appearing on the commissioner's "eligible* list under subsection
(iv) of this section are presumed to be substandard.
This paragraph (b) replaces existing Subsection (6" , so I hat ',. he
numbering; of existing Subsections (?) # (8)

and (9) can be

retained.

In Mr* Maguire's Exhibit D-3, it appears that
substituting "to" for "i f" would effectuate the intent of the
proposal.
In addition to the proposals advanced by Mr. Maguire,
the Department urges adoption of the following amendments# the
first of v/hich is taken from the NAIC model Non Admitted Insurance Act
1.

In Subsection 31A-J 5-J 02(3), add new subparagraphs

(d), (e) t (f) r (g) i (h) i and (i ) so that Subsection (3) reads as
follows:
(3)

Subsection (1) does not prohibit:

. (a)

an attorney acting for a client;

(b) a full-time salaried employee of an
insured acting in the capacity of an
insurance buyer or manager;
(c) insurance activities described under
Section 31A-15-103;
(d) matters authorized to be done by the
commissioner under Section 31A-2-309;
(e) transactions for wh4ch a certificate oi
authority to dfr-4yisiness 1^4101 required of

-2-
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V II

an insurer under the insurance laws of this
state;
(rt)

2.

reinsurance;

In Subsection 31A-15-103(7), divide the subsection

into paragraphs (a) and (b), and insert a requirement that the
disclosure be given before the time the policy is delivered.
Department proposes the following form:
(7)(a) A policy issued under this section
shall'include a description of the subject of
the insurancer and indicate the coverage,
conditions and term of the insurance, the
premium charged and premium taxes to be collected from the policyholder, and the name
and address of the policyholder and insurer.
If the direct risk is assumed by more than
one insurer, the policy shall state the names
and addresses of all insurers and the portion
of the entire direct risk each has assumed.
(b) When it becomes apparent that coverage
will be placed with a surplus lines insurer,
the surplus lines broker is obligated to
promptly furnish to the prospective insured a
statement in a form prescribed or approved by
the commissioner, informing the prospective
insured that coverage is being placed with an
insurer that has no certificate of authority
in this state, that the policy is being issued and delivered as a surplus lines

-3-
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The

coverage pursuant to this'chapter, that the
policyholder will not be protected by the
Utah guaranty association laws against default of the insurer, and that Utah law
requires payment by the policyholder of the
tax prescribed under 31A-3-301. Nothing
herein shall be construed to impose any civil
liability upon the surplus lines broker who
fails to provide the information required by
this subsection. The surplus lines broker
failing to furnish this statement shall be
liable for the penalties prescribed by
chapter 2,
3

The Department also supports a provision for organ-

izations such as the Surplus Lines Association of Utah/ and sug^gests adopting section 10 of the NAIC model Surplus Lines Insurance Act, set forth in Exhibit B to Mr, Magui re's statement*
Adopting the NAIC model wi II give Utah the benefits of NAIC's
work on the subject, including uniformity with the laws of other
states that adopt the model,
1.

In Section 31A-3-3 01, insert language exempting the

state from the surplus lines tax.
5.

In Subsection 31A-23-204(3), add the following

after the second sentence:
Additionally, the Commissioner shall require
the applicant to file with the commissioner,
and maintain during the term of the license,
in force and unimpaired, a bond in favor of
this state in the penal sum of $20,000, aggregate liability, with corporate sureties
approved by the commissioner. The bond shall
be conditioned that the surplus lines broker
will conduct business in accordance with
provisions of this title and will promptly
remit the taxes as provided by law. No bond
shall be terminated unless at least thirty
days1 prior written notice is given to the
broker and to the commissioner.
In my statement dated August 12, 1985r I urged adoption
of the amendments proposed in Mr. Maguire's statement, in Ilea of

-4-
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making other proposals for substantive and "housekeeping" changes
in Chapter 15.
1.

I now submit those proposals,
Include a reference to the definition of "unauthor-

ized insurer" under Subsection 31A-1-30K84) .
2.

In present Subsection 31A~15-103(5)(d), the first

and second sentences refer to "lists" while the third sentence
states, "In making this second ULsfc. . . ." (emphasis added) . The
reference to a single list is confusing.
3.

In present Subsection 31A-15-103(5)(d), amend the

last sentence -to read
No action lies against thp commissioner or any
employee of the department for any written or
oral communication made inr or in connection
with the issuance of, these lists or evaluations.
I propose the above language or some variation thereof in lieu of
the phrase "anything said in the issuance of these lists or
evaluations," which is imprecise and may afford too narrow
protection.
4.

in Subsection 31A-15-103O) , insert "as is

required" between "for" and "comparable policies."

Without the

insert, the sentence is incomplete.
5.

Amend Subsection 31A-15-105C3) by (1) inserting "or

in any manner aided, directly or indirectly," between "assisted"
and "in the procurement of an illegal contract"; (2) deleting
"and who knew or should have known the transaction was illegal";
and (3) adding a second sentence:

"The receiver appointed under

Chapter 27 may assert the claims of insureds if the insurer is
the subject of a proceeding under Chapter 27."

The first

amendment continues the broader sweep of section 31-38-3(3)(b),
-5-
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which includes persons other than salesmen who may nevertheless
be as culpable in procuring illegal contracts.

This broader

reach can be an important tool of the Commissioner.

See below.

The second amendment also perpetuates the intent and effect of
section 31-38-3(3) (b) and similar statutes of other sates, which
places the risk of a contract being illegal on those who attempt
to procure the signature of an insured, rather than of on the
insured, who is not as ] ikely to know the contract is illegal.
The third amendment clears up a question of" the Commissioner's
standing in the context of a delinquency proceeding under Chapter
27.

Giving the Commissioner this standing increases judicial

efficiency and economy by allowing the commissioner to "stand in
the shoes" of many insureds; the court need hear only
instead of many.

one action

The Department currently has at least two

delinquency proceedings involving unauthorized insurers pending
before the Third District Clour f J n which Section 31-3 8-3 (3) (b) is
implicated, particularly the Commissioner's standing to assert
the claims of insureds.
6

Make it clear that the Commissioner's rights and

remedies under Section 31A-2-308 apply to nonadmitted insurers
for violations of chapter 15, rules implementing Chapter 15, and
orders under Subsection 31A-2-20K4) enforcing Chapter 15,
7.

in Subsection 31A-15-106M ) , substitute "viol ating

this chapter" for '"being in violation of Utah law."

'This sub-

stitution confines^ the exception to Chapter 1 5j. which is all that
is necessary.

-6-
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8.

In Subsections 31A^15-110(1) and (2), substitute

"has reason to believe" for "knows."

The knowledge standard

arguably excuses an adjuster from informing the Commissioner
unless the adjuster is absolutely certain a contract is illegal.
Housekeeping
1.

In Subsection 31A-15-106U) , second sentence, I

believe the reference should be to Section 31A-3-301.
2.
for "exist"

in Subsection 31A-15-106(2), substitute "exists"
["unless one . . . exists"].

CLARK B. FETZER
&
Assistant Attorney General
130 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Telephones
(801) 533-5319
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able him to determine whether arrangements for payment of medical services are subject to the provisions of this act.
History: I». 1969, ch. 79, § 26.
Repealing Clause.
Section 27 of Laws 1969, ch. 79 provided: "Chapter 30 of Title 31, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, is hereby repealed."
Effective Date and Savings Clause.
Section 28 of Laws 1969, ch. 79 provided: "This act shall take effect on July
1, 1969, but any corporation organized
prior to the passage of this act, under the
laws of the state of Utah relating to
corporations not for profit, for the pur-

pose of administering, maintaining, and
operating a health service plan, as described in this act, shall be allowed a period of one year after the effective date
of this act to make the applications and
filings necessary to meet the requirements
of this act, and further, provided that
Buch a corporation shall be allowed a period of five years after the effective date
of this act to establish the liquid reserves
and deposit the guarantee fund with the
commissioner as required by section 3137-H."

CHAPTER 38
UNAUTHORIZED INSURERS ACT
Section 31-38-1. Title of act.
31-38-2. Purpose of act.
31-38-3. Transacting insurance business in state without certificate of authority unlawful—Exceptions—What constitutes transaction—Effect of failure to obtain certificate.
31-38-4. Violations—Injunctive relief.
31-38-5. Service of process—Appointment of secretary of state as agent—
Method of service—Sufficiency—Default judgment.
31-3S-6. Defense of action by unauthorized insurer—Requirements.
31-38-7. Enforcement of orders or decisions—Reciprocity—foreign decrees.
31-38-8. Penalty for violation of act.

31-38-1. Title of act.—This act shall he known and may he cited as
the "Utah Unauthorized Insurers Act."
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, §1.
Title of Act.
An act relating to insurance; requiring
insurers who transact insurance business
in the state to obtain a certificate of authority from the insurance commissioner;
providing exceptions; defining what constitutes the transaction of insurance;
authorizing injunctive relief against in-

surers; providing for service of process on
unauthorized insurers as to both administrative and court proceedings and requirements on such insurers when they
defend same; prescribing for enforcement
of decision and decrees in this state and
in reciprocal state; providing for procedure regarding foreign decrees; and proscribing penalties.—L. 1969, ch. 80.

31-38-2. Purpose of act.—The purpose of this act is to subject certain
insurers to the jurisdiction of the insurance commissioner and the courts of
this state in suits by or on behalf of the state. The legislature declares
that it is concerned with the protection of residents of this state against
acts by insurers not authorized to do an insurance business in this state,
by the maintenance of fair and honest insurance markets, by protecting
authorized insurers, which are subject to regulation from unfair competition
by unauthorized insurers, and by protecting against the evasion of the
insurance regulatory laws of this state. In furtherance of such state
interest, the legislature herein provides methods for substituted service
of process upon such insurers in any proceeding, suit or action in any
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court and substituted service of any notice, order, pleading or process
upon such insurers in any proceeding by the commissioner of insurance
to enforce or effect full compliance with the insurance laws of this state.
In so doing, the state exercises its powers to protect residents of this state
and to define what constitutes transacting an insurance business in this
state, and also exercises powers and privileges available to this state by
virtue of Public Law 79-15, 79th Congress of the United States, Chapter
20,1st Session, S. 340, 59 Stat. 33; 15 U.S.C. sections 1011 to 1015 inclusive,
as amended, which declares that the business of insurance and every person
engaged herein shall be subject to the laws of the several states.
History; L. 1969, ch. 80, § 2.

31-38-3. Transacting insurance business in state without certificate of
authority unlawful—Exceptions—What constitutes transaction—Effect of
failure to obtain certificate.—(1) It shall be unlawful for any insurer to
transact insurance business in this state, as set forth in subsection (2) of
this section, without a certificate of authority from the commissioner;
provided, however, that this section shall not apply to:
(a) The lawful transaction of surplus lines insurance.
(b) The lawful transaction of reinsurance by insurers.
(c) Transactions in this state involving a policy lawfully solicited,
written, and delivered outside of this state covering only subjects of insurance not resident, located, or expressly to be performed in this state
at the time of issuance, and which transactions are subsequent to the
issuance of such policy.
(d) Transactions in this state involving life insurance, disability
insurance or annuities provided to or by education or religious or charitable institutions organized and operated without profit to any private
shareholder or individual for the benefit of such institutions and individuals engaged in the service of such institutions.
(e) Attorneys acting in the ordinary relation of attorney and client
in the adjustment of claims or losses.
(f) Transactions in this state involving group life and group sickness
and accident or blanket sickness and accident insurance or group annuities where the master policy of such groups was lawfully issued and
delivered in and pursuant to the laws of a state in which the insurer was
authorized to do an insurance business, to a group organized for purposes
other than the procurement of insurance, and where the policyholder is
domiciled or otherwise has a bona fide situs.
(g) Transactions in this state involving any policy of insurance or
annuity contract issued prior to the effective date of this act.
(h) Transactions in this state relative to a policy issued or to be issued
outside this state involving insurance on vessels, craft or hulls, cargoes,
marine builder's risk, marine protection and indemnity or other risk,
including strikes and war risks commonly insured under ocean or wet
marine forms of policy.
(i) Transactions pursuant to section 31-15-19, Utah Code Annotated
1953.
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(2) Any of the following acts in this state effected by mail or otherwise
by or on behalf of an unauthorized insurer is deemed to constitute the
transaction of an insurance business in this state. The venue of an act
committed by mail is at the point where the matter transmitted by mail
is delivered and takes effect. Unless otherwise indicated, the term "insurer" as used in this section includes all corporations, associations, partnerships and individuals, engaged as principals in the business of insurance
and also includes interinsurance exchanges and mutual benefit societies.
(a) The making of or proposing to make, as an insurer, an insurance
contract.
(b) The making of or proposing to make, as guarantor or surety, any
contract of guaranty or suretyship as a vocation and not merely incidental
to any other legitimate business or activity of the guarantor or surety.
(c) The taking or receiving of any application for insurance.
(d) The receiving or collection of any premium, commission, membership fees, assessments, dues or other consideration for any insurance or
any part thereof.
(e) The issuance or delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of
this state or to persons authorized to do business in this state.
(f) Directly or indirectly acting as an agent for or otherwise representing or aiding on behalf of another any person or insurer in the solicitation,
negotiation, procurement or effectuation of insurance or renewals thereof
or in the dissemination of information as to coverage or rates, or forwarding of applications, or delivery of policies or contracts, or inspection of risks, a fixing of rates or investigation or adjustment of claims or
losses or in the transaction of matters subsequent to effectuation of the
contract and arising out of it, or in any other manner representing or
assisting a person or insurer in the transaction of insurance with respect
to subjects of insurance resident, located or to be performed in this state.
The provisions of this subsection (2) shall not operate to prohibit fulltime salaried employees of a corporate insured from acting in the capacity
of an insurance manager or buyer in placing insurance in behalf of such
employer.
(g) The transaction of any kind of insurance business specifically
recognized as transacting an insurance business within the meaning of the
statutes relating to insurance,
(h) The transacting or proposing to transact any insurance business in
substance equivalent to any of the foregoing in a manner designed to
evade the provisions of the statutes.
(3) (a) The failure of an insurer transacting insurance business in
this state to obtain a certificate of authority shall not impair the validity
of any act or contract of such insurer and shall not prevent such insurer
from defending any action at law or suit in equity in any court of this
state, but no insurer transacting insurance business in this state without
a certificate of authority shall be permitted to maintain an action in any
court of this state to enforce any right, claim or demand arising out of
the transaction of such business until such insurer shall have obtained a
certificate of authority.
347
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(b) In the event of failure of any such unauthorized insurer to pay any
claim or loss within the provisions of such insurance contract, any person
who assisted or in any manner aided directly or indirectly in the procurement of such insurance contract shall be liable to the insured for the full
amount of the claim or loss in the manner provided by the provisions of
such insurance contract.
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, § 3.
Compiler's Notes.
Chapter 80 of Laws 1969 carried no effective date clause.
Cross-Beference.
Prearranged funeral plans, 22-4-1 et seq.

Collateral References.
Insurance*®^.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 70.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 135, Insurance § 73.
Jurisdictional acts described in statutes
dealing with insurance contracts, 23 A. L.
E. 3d 606.

31-38-4. Violations—Injunctive relief.—Whenever the commissioner believes, from evidence satisfactory to him, that any insurer is violating or
about to violate the provisions of section 31-38-3, the commissioner may,
through the attorney general of this state, cause a complaint to be filed
in the district court of Salt Lake County to enjoin and restrain such insurer
from continuing such violation or engaging therein or doing any act in
furtherance thereof. The court shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding
and shall have the power to make and enter an order or judgment awarding such preliminary or final injunctive relief as in its judgment is proper.
History: I>. 1969, cH. 80, § 4.

31-38-5. Service of process—Appointment of secretary of state as
agent—Method of service—Sufficiency—Default judgment.—(1) Any act
of transacting an insurance business as set forth in section 31-38-3 by any
unauthorized insurer is equivalent to and shall constitute an irrevocable
appointment by such insurer, binding upon him, his executor or administrator, or successor in interest if a corporation, of the secretary of state, or
his successor in office, to be the true and lawful attorney of such insurer
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action, suit, or proceeding in any court by the commissioner of insurance or by the state
and upon whom may be served any notice, order, pleading or process
in any proceeding before tl^e commissioner of insurance and which arises
out of transacting an insurance business in this state by such insurer. Any
act of transacting an insurance business in this state by any unauthorized insurer shall be signification of its agreement that any such lawful
process in such court action, suit, or proceeding and any such notice, order,
pleading, or process in such administrative proceeding before the commissioner of insurance so served shall be of the same legal force and
validity as personal service of process in this state upon such insurer.
(2) Service of process in such action shall be made by delivering to
and leaving with the secretary of state, or some person in apparent charge
of his office, two copies thereof and by payment to the secretary of state
of the fee prescribed by law. Service upon the secretary of state as such
attorney shall be service upon the principal.
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(3) The secretary of state shall forthwith forward by certified mail
one of the copies of such process or such notice, order, pleading, or process
in proceedings before the commissioner to the defendant in such court
proceeding or to whom the notice, order, pleading, or process in such administrative proceeding is addressed or directed at its last-known principal
place of business and shall keep a record of all process so served on him
which shall show the day and hour of service. Such service is sufficient, if:
(a) Notice of such service and a copy of the court process or the
notice, order, pleading, or process in such administrative proceeding are
sent within ten days thereafter by certified mail by the plaintiff or the
plaintiff's attorney in the court proceeding or by the commissioner of
insurance in the administrative proceeding to the defendant in the court
proceeding or to whom the notice, order, pleading, or process in such
administrative proceeding is addressed or directed at the last-known principal place of business of the defendant in the court or administrative
proceeding.
(b) The defendant's receipt or receipts issued by the post office with
which the letter is certified, showing the name of the sender of the letter
and the name and address of the person or insurer to whom the letter is
addressed, and an affidavit of the plaintiff or the plaintiff's attorney in
court proceeding or of the commissioner of insurance in administrative
proceeding, showing compliance therewith are filed with the clerk of the
court in which such action, suit, or proceeding is pending or with the
commissioner in administrative proceedings, on or before the date the
defendant in the court or administrative proceeding is required to appear
or respond thereto, or within such further time as the court or commissioner
of insurance may allow.
(4) No plaintiff shall be entitled to a judgment or a determination by
default in any court or administrative proceeding in which court process
or notice, order, pleading, or process in proceedings before the commissioner
of insurance is served under this section until the expiration of 45 days
from the date of filing of the affidavit of compliance.
(5) Nothing in this section shall limit or affect the right to serve any
process, notice, order, or demand upon any person or insurer in any other
manner now or hereafter permitted by law.
History: L. 1969, en. 80, §5.
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Collateral References.
Insurance<8=>26.
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 83.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, Insurance § 88.
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31-38-6. Defense of action by unauthorized insurer—Requirements.—
(1) Before any unauthorized insurer files or causes to be filed in any
pleading in any court action, suit or proceeding or in any notice, order,
pleading, or process in sucb administrative proceeding before the commissioner instituted against such person or insurer, by seryices made as
provided in section 31-38-5, such insurer shall either:
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(a). Deposit with the clerk of the court in which such action, suit,
or proceeding is pending, or with the commissioner of insurance in administrative proceedings before the commissioner, cash or securities, or file with
such clerk or commissioner a bond with good and sufficient sureties, to be
approved by the clerk or commissioner in an amount to be fixed by the
court or commissioner sufficient to secure the payment of any final judgment
which may be rendered in such action or administrative proceeding.
(b) Procure a certificate of authority to transact the business of
insurance in this state.
(2) The commissioner of insurance, in any administrative proceeding
in which service is made as provided in section 31-38-5, may in his discretion, order such postponement as may be necessary to afford the defendant
reasonable opportunity to comply with the provisions of subsection (1) of
this section and to defend such action.
(3) Nothing in subsection (1) of this section shall be construed to
prevent an unauthorized insurer from filing a motion to quash a writ
or to set aside service thereof made in the manner provided in section
31-38-5, on the ground that such unauthorized insurer has not done any of
the acts enumerated in section 31-38-3.
History: L. 1969, ch. 80, § 6.

44 C.J.S. Insurance § 83.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, Insurance S 88.

CoUateral References.
Insurance@=»26.

31-38-7. Enforcement of orders or decisions — Reciprocity — Foreign
decrees.—The attorney general upon request of the commissioner may
proceed in the courts of this state or any reciprocal state to enforce an
order or decision in any court proceeding or in any administrative proceeding before the commissioner of insurance.
(1) As used in this section:
(a) The words "reciprocal state" mean any state or territory of the
United States the laws of which contain procedures substantially similar
to those specified in this section for the enforcement of decrees or orders
in equity issued by courts located in other states or territories of the
United States, against any insurer incorporated or authorized to do business in said state or territory.
(b) The words "foreign decree" mean any decree or order in equity
of a court located in a reciprocal state, including a court of the United
States located therein, against any insurer incorporated or authorized to
do business in this state.
(c) The words "qualified party" mean a state regulatory agency acting
in its capacity to enforce the insurance laws of its state.
(2) The insurance commissioner of this state shall determine which
states and territories qualify as reciprocal states and shall maintain at all
times an up-to-date list of such states.
(3) A copy of any foreign decree authenticated in accordance with the
statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any district
court of this state. The clerk, upon verifying with the insurance com350
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missioner that the decree or order qualifies as a foreign decree, shall treat
the foreign decree in the same manner as a decree of a district court of
this state. A foreign decree so filed has the same effect and shall be deemed
as a decree of a district court of this state, and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as
a decree of a district court of this state and may be enforced or satisfied
in like manner.
(4) (a) At the time of the filing of the foreign decree, the attorney
general shall make and file with the clerk of the court an affidavit setting
forth the name and last-known post-office address of the defendant.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign decree and the affidavit,
the clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign decree to the defendant at the address given and to the insurance commissioner of this state
and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. In addition, the attorney general may mail a notice of the filing of the foreign decree to
the defendant and to the insurance commissioner of this state and may
file proof of mailing with the clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by
the clerk shall riot affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by
the attorney general has been filed.
(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign decree
filed hereunder shall issue until thirty days after the date the decree is
filed.
(5) (a) If the defendant shows the district court that an appeal
from the foreign decree is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of
execution has been granted, the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign decree until the appeal is concluded, the time for appeal expires,
or the stay of execution expires or is vacated, upon proof that the defendant has furnished the security for the satisfaction of the decree required
by the state in which it was rendered.
(h) If the defendant shows the district court any ground upon which
enforcement of a decree of any district court of this state would be stayed,
the court shall stay enforcement of the foreign decree for an appropriate
period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the decree
which is required in this state.
(6) Any person filing a foreign decree shall pay to the clerk of court
the fee required for filing a complaint in the district court. Fees for docketing, transcription or other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided
for decrees of the district court.
History: I». 1969, ch. 80, § 7.

31-38-8, Penalty for violation of act.—Any unauthorized insurer who
transacts any unauthorized act of an insurance business as set forth in this
act may be fined not more than ten thousand dollars.
History: Ii. 1969, cfc. 80, § 8.
Separability Clause.
Section 9 of Laws 1969, ch. 80 provided: "If any provision of this act, or
the application of any provision to any
person or circumstance, 19 held invalid,

the remainder of this act shall not "be
affected thereby."
CoUateral Beferencea.
Insurance@=>27.
44 C.J.S. Insurance §86.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 152, insurance § 88.
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